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INTRODUCTION
M ARICOPA County, home of Phoenix, Arizona, is recreating
skid row. The county already has acquired several square
blocks of property south of downtown Phoenix for a "human ser-
vices campus" and plans to spend at least $24 million to relocate
governmental, nonprofit, and religious organizations that serve the
homeless to new facilities there.1 County officials hail the project as
a cutting-edge, integrated approach that will enable dispersed pro-
viders to better serve the area's large homeless population. But the
county's motives are not solely humanitarian. Currently, as many
as one thousand homeless people congregate on Phoenix's down-
town streets each night. Many of these individuals suffer from seri-
ous mental illness, substance abuse, or both.' Their presence also
may impede efforts to woo professionals downtown to live, work,
and play. Relocating the organizations that serve the homeless may
encourage their clients to spend time on the campus, rather than
on the downtown streets. As the county's promotional material as-
serts, "downtown Phoenix needs a campus so the current service
providers can better serve the persons who need assistance while
'Maricopa County, Human Services Campus: Capital Business Plan 8-10 (2002)
[hereinafter Capital Business Plan] (on file with the Virginia Law Review Associa-
tion).
2 Id. at 13.
1076 [Vol. 91:1075
Relocating Disorder
providing greater security and safety for them as well as the com-
munity."3
Maricopa County is not the only local government seeking to use
land-use policy to relocate the disorderly. Many other communities
have built, or are considering, homeless campuses. Other cities
have targeted inner-city neighborhoods for aggressive property in-
spections, hoping to address physical decay and to relocate those
individuals responsible for social disorder. At least two major cit-
ies-Portland, Oregon, and Cincinnati, Ohio-and several public-
housing authorities have adopted "neighborhood-exclusion zone"
policies. These policies, which incorporate both zoning and tres-
pass-law principles, empower local officials to exclude particularly
disorderly individuals from struggling communities. These tactics
employ different management techniques-some concentrate dis-
order and others disperse it-but they have same goal: Homeless
campuses, exclusion zones, and regulatory sweeps all seek to relo-
cate urban disorder from one place (where it is perceived to be
harmful) to another (where policymakers hope it will be more be-
nign).
Over the past two decades, policies seeking to curb urban disor-
der have become central to city renewal efforts.4 While the popu-
larity of these strategies is beyond question, their efficacy, wisdom,
and justice are the subject of a rich debate. The disorder-relocation
strategies outlined above contribute to that debate in an important
way. The vast majority of order-maintenance scholarship treats ur-
ban disorder primarily as a policing problem. But it is also a land-
management problem For many generations, police officers regu-
lated the level of disorder in our cities' public (and, to a lesser ex-
tent, private) spaces, usually informally, but also by enforcing laws
3 Id. at 17.
'These policies are often traced to James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. James
Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, Atlantic Monthly, Mar. 1982, at
29; see also Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 580
(1997) ("Broken Windows stimulated a flurry of scholarship on the subject of order
maintenance.").
'See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Pan-
handlers, Skid Rows and Public Space Zoning, 105 Yale L.J. 1165, 1171 (1996) [here-
inafter Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct] ("A specialist in property law ap-
proaches the issue of street order as a problem not of speech or of crime, but of land
management.").
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criminalizing public-order offenses-such as vagrancy, loitering,
and public drunkenness. The criminal procedure revolution of the
1960s and 1970s rendered many public-order offenses unenforce-
able,6 and cases from this era now haunt officials struggling to re-
store order in America's cities.'
Legal challenges have sent local lawmakers scrambling to find
order-maintenance policies that will survive judicial scrutiny.8 In
this environment, some city officials apparently have come to view
land-management strategies as (legally) "safer" alternatives to or-
der-maintenance policing. As in Phoenix, local governments are
increasingly adapting the tools of property regulation to a task tra-
ditionally reserved for the police-that is, the control of disorderly
people. This development is not surprising.9 Not only have urban
policymakers long assumed that regulations ordering land uses ef-
fectively curb disorder, t" but the broad deference granted to the
government-qua-regulator makes land-use policy particularly at-
tractive. Thus, these new disorder-relocation policies may create
what Dan Kahan has called a "cost of rights" problem:" In an ef-
fort to avoid constitutional challenges, local governments are turn-
ing to land-use policies that may impose costs at least as significant
as their order-maintenance policing substitutes. This Article will
ask what those costs might be.
This question is important because the institutional shift effected
by contemporary disorder-relocation strategies-transferring au-
thority to control the disorderly from police to planners-has pro-
found and understudied implications. These strategies change
6 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 4, at 595 (describing the fall of the public-order
enforcement regime after the constitutional reforms of 1960s and 1970s).
' Id. at 595-627 (discussing the continued impact of these decisions).
'See George L. Kelling & Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring
Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities 49-64 (1996) (discussing legislative
responses to judicial limits on order-maintenance policing).
'See, e.g., Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 1243 (argu-
ing that "federal constitutional law is indirectly encouraging cities to bring back Skid
Rows, but in a form far more official than the 1950s version").
0 But see Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 Stan. L. Rev.
1, 5 (2004) [hereinafter Garnett, Ordering the City] (asserting that "when property is
over- or misregulated, property regulations may impede efforts to restore a vibrant,
healthy, and organic public order").
"Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev.
349, 389 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Influence].
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more than the identity of the regulator; they also change the nature
of the regulation. When police informally manage disorder, officers
exercise discretion to make ex post determinations about what be-
haviors, and which individuals, threaten the public order. Disorder-
relocation strategies require ex ante determinations of who the
disorderly are and where disorder is most harmful. City officials
then rely upon these decisions to determine whether the individu-
als responsible for disorder should be concentrated or dispersed. A
number of legal scholars have criticized American land-use policy
precisely because it relies upon such predictive decisionmaking.
12
Ex ante decisions designed to minimize disorder often impose high
"prevention costs" because the predictions enshrined in land-use
policy are inevitably overbroad. 3 Moreover, they sometimes are
simply wrong. 4 The costs of integrating these predictions into for-
mal policies are worthy of more in-depth consideration than they
have received in the legal literature to date.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part I will briefly review the
debate over efforts to refocus urban policy in general, and police
strategies in particular, on curbing urban disorder. A rich social-
norms scholarship champions this trend, arguing that public-order
efforts are needed to reinforce the non-legal social controls that
keep disorder in check. 5 In response, criminal procedure scholars
12 See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the
Home-Business Dilemma, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1191, 1238 (2001) [hereinafter
Garnett, Home-Business Dilemma] (reviewing literature); Douglas W. Kmiec, De-
regulating Land Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 28, 52 (1981) (arguing that zoning is "incapable of assimilating rapid
changes in design, technology, or community preferences"); George W. Liebmann,
Devolution of Power to Community and Block Associations, 25 Urb. Law. 335, 342-
43 (1993) (characterizing zoning as a constraint on neighborhood change); Robert H.
Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private
Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827, 836
(1999) (arguing that zoning "fails wherever the objective is the transition from one
type of use to another").
See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 762 (1973).
1,See, e.g., Garnett, Ordering the City, supra note 10, at 5.
See, e.g., Wesley G. Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay
in American Neighborhoods 89-93 (1990); Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Miscon-
duct, supra note 5; Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of
Crime, 27 J. Legal Stud. 609 (1998); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and
(Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 Law & Soc'y Rev. 805 (1998) [hereinafter,
Meares & Kahan, Inner City].
10792005]
1080 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:1075
warn that order-promoting criminal laws threaten to undermine
civil liberties16 and that order-maintenance policing fails to reduce
crime. 7 Thus far, these criticisms, especially the former, have reso-
nated with some judges considering challenges to new public-order
policies."
This background review will set the stage for a discussion, in Part
II, of disorder-relocation policies adopted, at least in part, to re-
spond to cases invalidating order-maintenance policing innova-
tions. This Part will examine three mechanisms-homeless cam-
puses, neighborhood-exclusion zones, and regulatory sweeps-
through which local officials use property-regulation tools to man-
age urban disorder. This Part will further evaluate how well these
strategies respond to the legal objections to order-maintenance po-
licing.
Part III then will explore past efforts to treat urban disorder as a
land-management problem, including "skid rows," "red light dis-
tricts," and the construction and current demolition of high-rise
public-housing projects. This historical record will reveal that dis-
order-relocation efforts are nothing new. Urban policy has wa-
vered between disorder-concentration and disorder-dispersal for
over a century. It also will provide important insight into how well
new disorder-relocation efforts answer the concerns about "jus-
tice" and "efficacy" raised by order-maintenance opponents.
Part IV will turn to the "cost of rights" question and explore how
well disorder-relocation strategies respond to the primary critiques
of order-maintenance policing. Unfortunately, disorder-relocation
policies raise serious concerns about economic and racial justice
and may prove less efficacious. "Disorder zones"-skid rows, red
light districts, and high-rise public housing-may shield other areas
of a city from urban problems. These zones, however, have proven
so problematic that policymakers sought to disperse the disorder
"See, e.g., David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 Geo. L.J. 1059, 1062-63 (1999);
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 291, 294 (1998); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing,
89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 775 (1989).
See infra note 40 and accompanying text."See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
Relocating Disorder
within them, which in turn exposed more neighborhoods to disor-
der. Furthermore, the competing disorder management techniques
advance different, and possibly inconsistent, urban policy goals:
Concentration strategies are used to clean up downtown, by con-
taining the disorderly in less-desirable, poorer, neighborhoods; dis-
persal strategies aim to protect these poorer neighborhoods.
The Article will conclude in Part V by examining the implica-
tions of moving from a criminal-law to a land-management model
of disorder control. Order-maintenance proponents argue that an
over-scrupulous understanding of rights imposes the cost of disor-
der on poor neighborhoods. Despite this warning, however, courts
continue to worry about the risks entailed in policies requiring the
police to maintain disorder. In light of the potential costs imposed
by the land-management alternatives discussed in this Article, this
final Part will ask whether more searching judicial review of disor-
der-relocation policies would appropriately "rebalance" the cost of
rights.
I. ORDER-MAINTENANCE POLICING AND ITS CRITICS
Disorder-relocation policies are adopted against a longstanding
debate about when, how, and if local governments should address
urban disorder. This Part briefly outlines that debate in an attempt
to place these efforts in their legal and historical context.
A. The Re-Revolution in American Policing
Over the past century, American policing practices evolved from
proactive peacekeeping to a response-oriented focus on "law en-
forcement" to a renewed emphasis on preventing disorder (thus, a
partial return to peacekeeping). This well-known story need only
be briefly reviewed here. 9 In short, until the latter half of the twen-
tieth century, municipal police forces focused primarily on regulat-
ing and minimizing disorder. During this time, most order-
maintenance efforts were undoubtedly informal.' As James Q.
See generally Kelling & Coles, supra note 8; Livingston, supra note 4.20See, e.g., Howard M. Bahr, Skid Row: An Introduction to Disaffiliation 227-29
(1973) (reviewing arrest data); Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note
5, at 1200 (describing public-order regime); Livingston, supra note 4, at 595 ("Before
the constitutional reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, police operated ... under a broad
2005] 1081
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Wilson described in his classic, Varieties of Police Behavior, the pa-
trolman "approaches incidents that threaten order not in terms of
enforcing the law but in terms of 'handling the situation.'' 21 The
availability of legal sanctions for breaches of the public order,
however, provided an important backup to informal order-
maintenance efforts.2 2 Vagrancy, loitering, and public-drunkenness
prohibitions gave police officers vast discretion to decide when to
arrest an individual for a breach of the peace.23 Unfortunately, the
peacekeeping regime was not always a just one, as even strong pro-
ponents of order-maintenance policing acknowledge. The poor and
minorities frequently were targets of uneven and discriminatory
enforcement. 4 Moreover, as Caleb Foote's study of Philadelphia
vagrancy proceedings devastatingly illustrated, the legal system
frequently turned a blind eye to the myriad injustices perpetrated
in the name of public order.25
These realities formed the backdrop of the radical deregulation
of our urban public spaces. The Warren Court's "criminal proce-
dure revolution" accelerated this deregulation, but these changes
also were in keeping with contemporary policing theory. Twenti-
eth-century police reformers argued against beat officers and ac-
cused them of corruption and unequal enforcement. 26 By the early
1970s, the public-order enforcement regime largely had been
eliminated by reforms downplaying officers' crime-prevention
delegation of authority that licensed them to maintain order in public places largely as
they deemed appropriate.").
21 James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Or-
der in Eight Communities 31 (1968).
22 See, e.g., Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32
Am. Soc. Rev. 699, 702-03 (1967) (describing the threat of law enforcement a's a
backup to informal order maintenance); Wilson & Kelling, supra note 4, at 35 (argu-
ing that police need "the legal tools to remove undesirable persons from a neighbor-
hood when informal efforts to preserve order in the streets have failed").
3 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 4, at 595 ("Many citizens were rendered almost
perpetually subject to arrest pursuant to catchall vagrancy laws."); William J. Stuntz,
Crime Talk and Law Talk, 23 Rev. Am. Hist. 153, 157 (1995) ("Prior to the 1960s, va-
grancy and loitering laws made it possible for police to arrest pretty much anyone.").
2 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 16, at 1060 (noting "abuse of the criminal law to rein-
force racial subordination").
2 Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603
(1956) (describing summary vagrancy proceedings).
26 See Cole, supra note 16, at 1062-63 (noting that "beat" officers were associated
with corruption and racial discrimination).
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functions.27 The limitations of these reforms became apparent by
the end of the decade. 2' Frustration with the new "law-
enforcement" model of policing in turn led to new reforms refocus-
ing on order maintenance in more recent decades.29
These policies have found forceful support among social-norms
scholars who argue that order-restoration efforts will not only curb
disorder, but also reduce serious crime.30 They reason that because
people tend to be law abiding when they perceive that their
neighbors are obeying the law, 3' disorder "erode[s] deterrence by
emboldening law-breakers and demoralizing law-abiders. ' '32 Thus,
intervening to check disorder will reinvigorate the informal social
controls necessary for orderly, law-abiding communities.3 Wesley
Skogan's Disorder and Decline used survey evidence from forty
residential neighborhoods in six cities to link disorder with
neighborhood decline, safety, and, importantly, serious crime.'
B. The Critics Respond
The academic commentary generated by the order-maintenance
revolution primarily addresses the constitutional limits on police
21 See generally KeUing & Coles, supra note 8, at 80-85 (reviewing history); Livingston,
supra note 4, at 565-68 (same).
See, e.g., Kelling & Coles, supra note 8, at 85-89 (describing the collapse of re-
form-era policing strategies); Livingston, supra note 4, at 568 (describing frustration
with rising crime rates).29 See, e.g., George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, From Political to Reform to
Community: The Evolving Strategy of Police, in Community Policing: Rhetoric or
Reality 3, 18-23 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988) (discussing re-
form); Herman Goldstein, Toward Community-Oriented Policing: Potential, Basic
Requirements, and Threshold Questions, 33 Crime & Delinq. 6 (1987) (same).
3 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Polic-
ing, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1513, 1527-38 (2002); Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 11, at
367-73.
31 See, e.g. Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Dis-
approval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. Crim. L & Crimi-
nology 325 (1980) (compiling empirical data).32 Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 11, at 387.
See infra Part II.B.
See Skogan, supra note 15, at 65-84; see also Police Found., The Newark Foot Pa-
trol Experiment 122-24 (1981) (finding that regular foot patrols did not reduce crime
but lowered citizens' fear of crime); Robert Trojanowicz, An Evaluation of the
Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan 85-87 (1982) (finding that foot
patrols reduced crime).
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efforts to curb disorder in public places.3 5 Order-maintenance pro-
ponents assert that the law must trust police officers to exercise
peacekeeping discretion.36 Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares, in par-
ticular, reason that significant changes in the sociopolitical realities
of inner-city America reduce concerns about police abuses.37 Not
only does urban disorder wreak the greatest havoc in the poorest
neighborhoods, but residents of these communities demand order-
maintenance policies.38
Critics attack these arguments in two ways. First, they assert that
proponents seriously underestimate the extent to which order-
maintenance efforts threaten to undermine the civil liberties of
marginalized groups.39 Second, they argue that order-maintenance
policing does not work-that is, that curbing disorder will not re-
duce serious crime. ' Moreover, while the social-norms arguments
appear to be carrying the day politically, order-maintenance critics
continue to win in the courts: Judicial skepticism of the "new polic-
ing" remains a significant impediment to implementing the order-
maintenance agenda.4 In Chicago v. Morales, the United States
" See Livingston, supra note 4, at 564 ("[T]the new focus on the problems of disor-
der ... will lead-as it already has led-to more contention over the proper bounds of
police authority.").36 See, e.g., Kelling & Coles, supra note 8, at 169 (arguing that "we must recognize
and accept the legitimate use of police discretion").
37 See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights are Wrong: The Paradox of
Unwanted Rights, in Urgent Times: Policing and Rights in Inner-City Communities 3,
3-30 (Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan eds., 1999) [hereinafter Meares & Kahan,
Unwanted Rights]; Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis
of Criminal Procedure, 86 Geo. L.J. 1153, 1160-71 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan &
Meares, Coming Crisis].
m See Meares & Kahan, Unwanted Rights, supra note 37, at 15; Kahan & Meares,
Coming Crisis, supra note 37, at 1160; see also Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal
Law and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1255, 1256 (1994)
(arguing that "a misguided antagonism toward efforts to preserve public safety" is the
main problem plaguing African-Americans).
39 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, More Wrong than Rights, in Urgent Times: Policing
and Rights in Inner-City Communities 49, 49-57 (Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan
eds., 1999) (questioning Meares and Kahan's account); Cole, supra note 16, at 1062
(arguing that "the new discretion scholars underestimate the continuing threat of ra-
cial discrimination in the administration of criminal justice").
" See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Bro-
ken Windows Policing 59-127 (2001) (providing an empirical critique of order-
maintenance claims).
41 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 4, at 631-38 (discussing judicial ambivalence to-
ward police discretion and the new policing).
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Supreme Court held that an ordinance that criminalized the act of
loitering with a "criminal street gang member" was unconstitution-
ally vague. 2 Other courts have ruled that public-order policies run
afoul of various substantive rights, including the freedom of ex-
pression, the right to travel, parental liberty, and the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on "status" crimes."
II. CONTEMPORARY DISORDER-RELOCATION STRATEGIES
Against this legal backdrop, local officials seeking to implement
public-order policies have learned to ask, "[W]ill we get sued?"'
This concern has prompted Kahan and Meares to warn of a "com-
ing crisis" in criminal procedure, 5 but lawsuit-weary officials may
instead seek to avert this crisis by enacting narrower, more "rule-
like" ordinances. 6 In this environment, the three land-management
strategies discussed below-homeless campuses, regulatory "sweeps,"
and "neighborhood-exclusion zones"-are attractive. They permit
officials to avoid codifying-and thus subjecting to legal chal-
lenge-the exercises of police discretion by taking advantage of the
traditional deference granted to regulators of private property.47
A. Disorder Concentration: The Example of the
Homeless Campus
Phoenix's "human services campus" may be the most ambitious
effort to centralize homelessness services, but it is not the only one.
Maricopa County's project is modeled upon a smaller "campus" in
42527 U.S. 41 (1999).
3See, e.g., Loper v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 1993) (enjoin-
ing an anti-begging ordinance on First Amendment grounds); Berkeley Cmty. Health
Project v. City of Berkeley, 902 F. Supp. 1084, 1091-95 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (same); see
also Hodgkins v. Peterson, 335 F.3d 1048, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding a curfew
violated First Amendment and implicated parental rights); Nunez v. City of San
Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944-46, 949-51 (9th Cir. 1997) (invalidating a curfew on First
Amendment and right to travel grounds). But see Hutchins v. District of Columbia,
188 F.3d 531, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding a juvenile curfew law); Qutb v. Strauss,
11 F.3d 488, 496 (5th Cir. 1993) (same).
"Kelling & Coles, supra note 8, at 4.
" Kahan & Meares, Coming Crisis, supra note 37, at 1153.46 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 4, at 615.
17 See generally Kelling & Coles, supra note 8, at 169-75 (discussing the need to
come "to grips with police discretion"); Livingston, supra note 4, at 649 (asserting that
the exercise of discretion is inevitable, and necessary, to public-order policies).
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Orlando, Florida, which features an outdoor covered "Pavilion"
providing sleeping accommodations (essentially, and somewhat
disturbingly, human parking spaces), meals, and showers for 375
men, a smaller indoor residential treatment facility, and a residen-
tial facility for homeless women and children. ' Smaller homeless
campuses exist in Anchorage, Atlanta, Washington, D.C., Sacra-
mento, San Antonio, Jacksonville, Ft. Lauderdale, Miami, Las Ve-
gas, and New Orleans.49 And campuses have been considered in
Dayton, Chicago, Colorado Springs, Honolulu, Salt Lake City, and
even Hyannis, Massachusetts."0
In an age of tight budgets and "compassion fatigue,"'" why would
cities build expensive homeless campuses? While city officials cite
the promise of coordinated services, homeless advocates argue that
campuses warehouse the homeless out of sight. 2 A proposal to cre-
ate a "compassion zone" in Kansas City, Missouri, supports the lat-
ter hypothesis. Within the compassion zone, a new daytime drop-in
shelter would provide an alternative to wandering the thirteen
blocks between existing shelters and a large downtown soup
kitchen. The director of the Downtown Community Improvement
District calls these blocks "kind of a trail of tears." That the "com-
passion zone" is viewed as a way to "shoo undesirables out of the
" See generally Coal. for -the Homeless of Cent. Fla., at http://
www.centralfloridahomeless.org (describing the Orlando campuses) (last accessed
July 12, 2005); see also Ctr. for Poverty Solutions, Helping People Off the Streets:
Real Solutions to Urban Homelessness 11-12 (1998), available at
http://www.povertysolutions.org/library/campus.pdf (criticizing the Orlando campus).
'See Ctr. for Poverty Solutions, supra note 48, at 2. For a closer look at particular
homeless campuses, see, for example, Bill Banks, Shelter's Leader Called a "Model of
Tenacity," Atlanta J.-Const., Sept. 23, 1999, at J1-7 (Atlanta); Jason DeParle, "Safety
Net" for Anchorage Homeless Is Seen as both a Lifesaver and a Trap, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 24, 1992, at B12 (Anchorage); Christina Jewett, Homeless Programs May Face
Cuts, Sacramento Bee, Mar. 15, 2004, at B1 (Sacramento); Jan Moller, LV Chips in to
Keep Crisis Center Open, Las Vegas Rev.-J., Feb. 20, 2003, at 5B (Las Vegas).
" See Editorial, A Hard Bargain, Salt Lake Trib., Sept. 12, 2004, at AA2; Erin Em-
ery, Ideas to Aid Homeless Unveiled, Denver Post, Apr. 3, 2002, at B4; James Gon-
ser, Homeless Center Appears Doomed, Honolulu Advertiser, June 1, 2004, at Al;
Cynthia McCormick, Homeless Campus Site Best of Few Option, Cape Cod Times,
Sept. 21, 2003.
See, e.g., Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 1167-68 (de-
scribing the backlash against the homeless as "compassion fatigue").
52 See Ctr. for Poverty Solutions, supra note 48, at 8 ("The motivation behind the
passage of anti-homeless ordinances seems consistent among all jurisdictions: remove
homeless people from the downtown and/or business districts.").
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central business district," is made apparent when it is coupled with
other city land-use plans. Officials anticipate establishing a "secu-
rity zone" around the new city's new main library. A city ordinance
would exclude all individuals with criminal records from the area.
Homeless advocates assert that the purpose of the policy is to pre-
vent the new library branch from becoming a de facto daytime
shelter-a role that the existing main library currently serves:"
Campuses also may deflect criticisms that using order-
maintenance policing against the homeless is both inhumane and
unconstitutional. 4 Importantly, for city officials, a successful legal
challenge to a local government's decision to establish a campus is
unlikely. While the constitutionality of criminalizing behaviors
linked with homelessness remains an open question, the constitu-
tionality of most local land-use policies does not. As a matter of
federal constitutional law, non-confiscatory land-use regulations
are subject to rational basis review-that is, they will be upheld if
some conceivable government interest justifies them." This is cer-
tainly the case for homeless campuses. A campus serves at least
two "conceivable" policy goals-improving homeless services and
aiding downtown redevelopment.
Nor could the neighbors who might suffer a reduction in prop-
erty values because of a campus successfully object on "takings"
grounds. Government actions resulting in less than a total depriva-
tion of all economic value are subject to ad hoc judicial review that
strongly favors the government. 6 Moreover, any reduction in prop-
erty values attributable to a homeless campus arguably would not
" Mike Hendricks, A Homeless Zone of their Own, Kan. City Star, Dec. 31, 2003, at
B1; see also Armstrong v. D.C. Pub. Library, 154 F. Supp. 2d 67, 75-82 (D.D.C. 2001)
(holding that the library's expulsion of homeless man for disheveled appearance vio-
lated the First and Fifth Amendments); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Morristown,
765 F. Supp. 181, 193-94 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that the library could not exclude
homeless person from library because of his odor), rev'd, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269-70 (3rd
Cir. 1992).
See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
15See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 934, 940-42 (2003) [hereinafter Garnett, Public Use Question]
(discussing standard of review); Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional
Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 591, 602-04 (1998) (same);
Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1607 (1988) (same).56 See, e.g., David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings 121-22 (2002)
(discussing standard of review).
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warrant even this deferential scrutiny. Under certain narrow cir-
cumstances, "inverse condemnation" claims are available to rem-
edy economic damages that result indirectly from government ac-
tions.57 Absent a showing that the physical invasion of a plaintiff's
property was the foreseeable result of a campus construction, how-
ever, the owner likely would suffer what Abraham Bell and
Gideon Parchomovsky have called a non-cognizable "derivative
taking."5 In this case, neighbors harmed by campus-related disor-
der could seek nuisance damages, but such relief would be avail-
able only after the campus was constructed and the property own-
ers injured.59 Moreover, a few states do not permit nuisance suits
against local governments;' others preclude injunctive relief.61
Homeless campuses, in other words, may be expensive, but they
also are virtually lawsuit proof.
B. Disorder Dispersal Through Regulatory Enforcement:
Housing Code "Sweeps"
Judicial deference to private-property regulation also makes a
second disorder-relocation strategy-the targeted use of aggressive
property inspections-an attractive alternative to order-
maintenance policing.62 Consider the following example: Several
years ago, the Washington Post Magazine featured a building in-
spector's one-man crusade to incorporate his job into the District
of Columbia's "community policing" efforts. In the article, James
Delgado, the "building inspector with a bullet proof vest," argued
that his city failed to understand the order-maintenance value of
7 See, e.g., Moden v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 275, 280 (2004).
"See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 Yale L.J. 547, 559
(2001) (arguing that derivative takings fall outside the taxonomy of takings law); see
also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980) ("Mere fluctuations in
value during the process of governmental decisionmaking... are 'incidents of owner-
ship. They cannot be considered as a "taking" in the constitutional sense."') (quoting
Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939)).
" See Robert C. Ellickson & Vicki L. Been, Land Use Controls 618 (2d ed. 2000);
see also Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Episcopal Cmty. Serv., 712 P.2d 914,
923 (Ariz. 1985) (enjoining a soup kitchen operation).
60 For an overview, see Liability for Creation or Maintenance of a Nuisance, 57 Am.
Jur. 2d Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 120 et seq. (2001).
61 See Ellickson & Been, supra note 59, at 618.
62 See Garnett, Ordering the City, supra note 10, at 13-19 (discussing the use of
regulatory inspections to suppress disorder).
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building inspections. "The regulatory code book is pretty thick," he
observed. And, his aggressive and unorthodox inspections proved
that he had learned to use every page to his advantage. Delgado
had closed crack houses, brothels, and drug markets for numerous
regulatory infractions (for example, operating an illegal home busi-
ness).63
Housing and building inspections regimes generally are consid-
ered corrupt and ineffective.' Furthermore, a substantial economic
literature suggests that the cost of code compliance contributes to
urban blight.65 Nevertheless, the Washington Post Magazine article
certainly leaves the impression that Delgado's efforts were wel-
comed by the community and that their replication holds much
promise. This view apparently is shared by most city regulators. In
a recent study by John Accordino and Gary Johnson, almost every
respondent listed code enforcement as the single-best way to deal
with property blight.'
It is easy to see why city regulators like aggressive regulatory in-
spections. Residents understand all too well that abandoned and
deteriorating property is a sure sign of serious neighborhood de-
cline.67 Not only do blighted properties discourage neighborhood
63 See Peter Perl, Building Inspector with a Bulletproof Vest, Wash. Post Mag., June
27, 1999, at 8.
'See H. Laurence Ross, Housing Code Enforcement as Law in Action, 17 Law &
Pol'y 133, 157-58 (1995); see also Peter D. Salins & Gerard C.S. Mildner, Scarcity by
Design: The Legacy of New York City's Housing Policies 42 (1992); William Spelman,
Abandoned Buildings: Magnets for Crime?, 21 J. Crim. Just. 481, 492 (1993).
65 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 470-74 (4th ed. 1992) (at-
tributing shortage of affordable housing to housing codes); Stephen R. Seidel, Hous-
ing Costs & Government Regulations: Confronting the Regulatory Maze 73-75
(1978); Peter D. Salins, Reviving New York City's Housing Market, in Housing and
Community Development in New York City: Facing the Future 53, 54-55 (Michael H.
Schill ed., 1999) (blaming New York City's housing shortage in part on overly com-
plex building regulations). On the difference between housing and building codes, see
Ross, supra note 64, at 134 ("Housing codes differ from building codes in that they
are not primarily concerned with structure and materials but rather with function and
condition.").
66 See John Accordino & Gary T. Johnson, Addressing the Vacant and Abandoned
Property Problem, 22 J. Urb. Affairs 301, 309 (2000).
67See Skogan, supra note 15, at 36; Accordino & Johnson, supra note 66, at 306
(finding that city administrators believe that abandoned property has a highly nega-
tive effect on neighborhood vitality); Susan D. Greenbaum, Housing Abandonment
in Inner-City Black Neighborhoods: A Case Study of the Effects of the Dual Housing
Market, in The Cultural Meaning of Urban Space 139, 140 (Robert Rotenberg &
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investment, decrease tax revenues and property values, and in-
crease insurance costs,' but "[c]rooks, killers, and losers tend to in-
fest areas with dead buildings, like maggots on a carcass."6 9 Incom-
plete but selectively aggressive inspections can address the latter
problem by closing abandoned buildings and dispersing the crimi-
nals who use them for "hangouts." In an unguarded moment, a
student of mine-a former police officer in a large city-told me
that some officers would enlist building inspectors to close down
buildings inhabited by drug dealers, gang members, and other
"troublemakers." The police viewed the closures as a way to pre-
vent further neighborhood decline by forcing these individuals to
find somewhere else to hang out, hopefully outside of the commu-
nity. At least one study confirms the officers' instincts, finding that
crime "displacement" is a significant benefit of housing inspec-
tions.7"
Moreover, the regulatory code book is, as James Delgado ob-
served, "pretty thick."'" Academics tend to treat this "thickness" as
a problem.72 But as James Delgado said, it "open[s] up miraculous
possibilities."73 A recent case in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit illustrates why. Several years ago, San Berna-
dino, California, conducted housing code "sweeps" in a low-
income area. As the Ninth Circuit observed, the "sweeps were
massive undertakings, with city officials, police, firefighters, and
housing-code inspectors descending on the area to inspect dozens
of pre-selected buildings."74 Over a six-month period, the city
closed ninety-five buildings. The property owners alleged that the
city trumped up a building-code emergency to force the eviction of
Gary McDonogh eds., 1993) ("Empty buildings, weedy lots, quantities of unsavory
litter, and angry graffiti suggest profound maladies.").
68 See Accordino & Johnson, supra note 66, at 303; Greenbaum, supra note 67, at
143; Benjamin P. Scafidi et al., An Economic Analysis of Housing Abandonment, 7 J.
Housing Econ. 287, 288 (1998).
69Accordino & Johnson, supra note 66, at 303.71 See Spelman, supra note 64, at 492-94.
71 See Perl, supra note 63, at 26-27.
72 See Ellickson & Been, supra note 59, at 529 ("A building code is a technical
document with a level of difficulty that at times may rival that of the Internal Reve-
nue Code."); Ross, supra note 64, at 143.7
3 Perl, supra note 63, at 26.
71 See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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tenants with criminal records and gang affiliations.75 A panel of the
Ninth Circuit rejected the claim that the sweeps were arbitrary, and
therefore, unconstitutional.76 The majority reasoned that even if the
city "faked" a housing-code emergency, "the reduction of crime by
relocating criminals and reducing urban blight bears a rational rela-
tion to the public health, safety and general welfare."" The panel
reached this conclusion over the vigorous dissent of Judge Trott,
who argued,
[t]he action cannot be justified as a means to control crime. If
criminals are living in the units, the police should arrest them. If
crime... is rampant, the police should put a stop to it. The city
cannot simply start throwing innocent people out of private
property to reduce crime in a troubled neighborhood. A contrary
rule is simply unimaginable. 8
A divided en banc court affirmed. 9
This lax oversight undoubtedly is one reason' many cities are in-
corporating sweeps into order-maintenance efforts." For example,
Albuquerque, New Mexico's super squad of code-enforcement offi-
cers, known as the "Safe City Strike Force," inspected 1450 properties
between 2002 and 2004.' In May and June of 2003, Tampa, Florida's
"Operation Commitment" sent dozens of police officers, drug and
"' Id. at 1314.
76 Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860, 866-68 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated in part, 75
F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
"' Id. at 867.
78 Id. at 872 (Trott, J., dissenting).
75 F.3d at 1313, 1328.
8 Lower Fourth Amendment standards may be another reason. See infra notes 260-
271 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Erin Grace, Clock Ticking on Junk Cars, Weeds, Omaha World Herald,
Apr. 30, 2003, at 1B; Jonathan Heller, Escondido Targets Housing Violations, San
Diego Union-Trib., Nov. 3, 2001, at 1; Iliana Limon, Code Enforcers, Albuquerque
Trib., July 19, 2004, at Al; Lakiesha McGhee, Businesses Face Cleanup Order:
County Takes Cooperative Approach in Citing Code and Blight Woes In Orangevale,
Sacramento Bee, Feb. 6, 2005, at N1; Flori Meeks, City Targets Code Violators on
Long Point; Sweep Finds Nearly 200 Illegal Issues, Houston Chron. (Memorial/Spring
BranchlUptown edition), Oct. 18, 2000, at 1; Michael Pearson, Raising Lowe Lane:
Gang Area Targeted by Alpharetta Cops, Atlanta J.-Const., Nov. 3, 2002, at El; Erik
Siemers, City Focuses on La Mesa Area For Cleanup, Albuquerque Trib., Mar. 16,
2005, at A2; Janet Zink, Zoning Code Leniency Ending, St. Petersburg Times, Oct.
15, 2004, at 3B.
2 Limon, supra note 81.
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prostitution counselors, and property inspectors through the city's
worst neighborhoods. One sweep netted seven felony arrests and
122 code violations.83 Recent mayoral candidates in Dallas, Detroit,
and Indianapolis made election promises to step up enforcement
sweeps, suggesting that the practice likely will continue. '
C. Disorder Dispersal Through Public-Space Zoning:
Neighborhood-Exclusion Zones
Other local government entities have begun to use zoning laws
to exclude the "disorderly" from troubled communities. Several
years ago, Robert Ellickson hypothetically suggested that zoning
laws, which usually dictate the appropriate uses of private prop-
erty, might be extended to govern the acceptable uses of public
spaces as well. He proposed dividing a city's public spaces into
three zones, with "three codes, of varying stringency, governing
street behavior" within each zone. Most city streets would fall into
a "yellow zone," where episodic (but not chronic) disorder is per-
mitted. The remainder would be divided between "green zones,"
where aberrant behavior is strictly curtailed in an effort to create
"places of refuge for the unusually sensitive" and "red zones"
where significant social disorder is tolerated. Ellickson's zoning
scheme would manage disorder primarily by concentrating it in
"red zones," which he specifically analogized to skid rows.85
In contrast to Ellickson's hypothetical concentration strategy,
most formal public-space zoning policies employ a disorder-
dispersal strategy. In Ellickson's terms, some local governments
are seeking to use public-space zoning to make their "red" zones
"yellow." A number of public-housing authorities exclude nonresi-
dent troublemakers from projects, much as a private landlord
might. 6 Additionally, Portland, Oregon, and Cincinnati, Ohio,
13Tamara Lush, East Tampa Crime Sweep Includes Counselors, St. Petersburg
Times, May 13, 2003, at 6B.
" See Editorial, Broken Windows are a Clue to Livability, Indianapolis Star, Jan. 18,
2002 at A14 (Indianapolis); Cameron McWhirter, Archer Tries to Balance Budget
and Re-Election, Detroit News, Mar. 4, 2001, at 1A (Detroit); Colleen McCain Nel-
son, City Trains Sights on Neighborhood Blight, Dallas Morning News, May 6, 2002,
at 1A (Dallas).
See Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 1220-23.
See, e.g., New York City Housing Authority, Trespass Policy for Felony Drug Ar-
rests (2005), available at http://www.nyc.gov/htmi/nycha/pdf/trespass-policy.pdf.
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have adopted "drug-exclusion zone" laws that apply the anti-
trespass principle to entire troubled neighborhoods.87 For example,
Cincinnati's drug-exclusion law banned all persons arrested for
drug offenses within any designated "drug-exclusion zone" from
the "public streets, sidewalks, and other public ways" in the zone
for ninety days; upon conviction, the exclusion was extended to
one year.' Persons excluded under the ordinance were subject to
prosecution for criminal trespass if they return during that time.
89
In its regulatory takings cases, the Supreme Court often has
stated that the "right to exclude" is "one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property."'  With neighborhood-exclusion zones, local govern-
ments seek to borrow this treasured strand
9' of the property-rights
bundle to augment order-maintenance efforts. Thus trespass-
zoning laws incorporate two different property-regulation de-
vices-zoning laws, which divide cities into various "use districts,"
and trespass laws, which protect the right to exclude.' Trespass-
zoning laws differ from traditional zoning laws in important re-
spects, of course. A neighborhood-exclusion zone scheme estab-
lishes the appropriate users of public streets and sidewalks, rather
than the appropriate uses of private property.
Neighborhood-exclusion zones are, in many respects, the mirror
image of homeless campuses. While campuses concentrate the
"disorderly" to a central location, exclusion zones disperse them.
17 See Peter M. Flanagan, Note, Trespass-Zoning: Ensuring Neighborhoods a Safer
Future by Excluding Those With A Criminal Past, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 327, 330-
31 (2003); see also Stephanie Smith, Note, Civil Banishment of Gang Members: Cir-
cumventing Criminal Due Process Requirements?, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1461, 1465-68
(2000) (describing Cicero, Illinois's use of civil banishment sanctions to exclude gang
members).
"See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 487-88 (6th Cir. 2002).
'9 Id. at 488 (citing Cincinnati Mun. Code § 755-5 (1996)).
"Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 164); Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (same); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (same).
91 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
See Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62
Ohio St. L.J. 1409, 1430 (2001) (discussing drug-exclusion zone policies); Kim Stros-
nider, Anti-Gang Ordinances after City of Chicago v. Morales: The Intersection of
Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 101, 129 (2002) (same).
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The two strategies also advance very different policy goals. Home-
less campuses seek to draw disorder away from the central business
district to aid redevelopment. In contrast, neighborhood-exclusion
zones-like regulatory sweeps-seek to protect the most vulner-
able neighborhoods from the ravages of disorder.93 The underlying
theory is that some communities are so overwhelmed by drugs and
violence that the threat of additional disorder is simply untenable.
Thus, in order to protect these communities, it becomes necessary
to exclude individuals who previously helped create disorder.94
In contrast to the two disorder-relocation policies discussed pre-
viously, however, city officials cannot expect courts automatically
to extend carte blanche approval to exclusion-zone policies. Regu-
lations governing the acceptable users of public spaces raise differ-
ent constitutional concerns than regulations governing the accept-
able uses of private property. While lawsuit-weary officials may see
exclusion zones as a way to avoid the "vagueness" concerns that
plague new order-maintenance policing efforts,95 these policies re-
main vulnerable to other constitutional challenges.
First Amendment Expression Claims. The Supreme Court unani-
mously turned away a First Amendment "overbreadth" challenge
to a public-housing exclusion-zone policy in Virginia v. Hicks.'
Kevin Hicks had argued that his exclusion from a public-housing
project for lacking a "legitimate business or social purpose" was in-
consistent with the First Amendment because housing-authority
officials might use the policy to exclude individuals who wished to
engage in expressive activities. The Court reasoned that Hicks's
exclusion resulted from non-expressive conduct (trespassing and
3 The Kansas City proposal discussed above suggests that neighborhood-exclusion
zones also also direct disorder away from "gentrifiable" areas. See supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
" See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that
Cincinnati's ordinance protects "neighborhoods with a 'significantly higher incidence
of conduct associated with drug abuse than other areas of the City') (quoting Cin-
cinnati, Ohio Ordinance No. 229-1996, § 1(A), (D) (Aug. 7, 1996)); see also id. at 488
("The Ordinance defines drug-exclusion zones as 'areas where the number of arrests
for ... drug-abuse related crimes.., is significantly higher than that for other simi-
larly situated/sized areas of the city.').
" See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 4, at 646-50 (discussing the vagueness doctrine).
539 U.S. 113 (2003).
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vandalism) and that expressive activity presumably would be a "le-
gitimate business or social purpose. 97
Hicks, however, does not rule out a First Amendment challenge
to a broader neighborhood-exclusion zone policy.
98 When applied
in a public-housing project, no-trespass rules arguably are a
straightforward application of a landlord's right to exclude outsid-
ers from a quasi-private development. It is unclear whether the
Court's approval of the use of trespass laws in this context would
extend to the exclusion of individuals from public thoroughfares in
a large section of a city.' That said, the reasons given for upholding
the trespass policy at issue in Hicks apply with equal force to the
drug-exclusion zones in Portland and Cincinnati. The policies are
clearly content-neutral and any questions about whether exclusions
deprive would-be speakers of "adequate alternative channels of
communication" could presumably be addressed with a variance
provision like the one in place in Hicks."°°
Right to Travel Claims. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit recently ruled that Cincinnati's drug-exclusion law
violated the Fourteenth Amendment "right" to intrastate travel.'
The Ohio Supreme Court also invalidated the Cincinnati ordinance
on right-to-travel grounds, reasoning that "[e]very citizen of this
state ... enjoys the freedom of mobility... to roam about inno-
cently in the wide-open spaces of our state parks or through the
streets and sidewalks of our most populous cities."'
0" While these
decisions render Cincinnati's ordinance unenforceable, they do not
close the book on exclusion-zone policies.
3 Indeed, the right-to-
travel questions are complicated by at least two factors. First, be-
fore considering the contours of a substantive due process "right to
97Id. at 122.
Hicks is the second recent decision to grant the government-qua-landlord signifi-
cant leeway to restore order. See Dep't of Hous. Auth. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002)
(upholding a "one-strike-and-you're-out" eviction policy for illegal drug activity).
9The parties briefed this point, but the Court did not discuss whether the concerns
of public housing were unique. See Brief for Petitioner at 32-43, Hicks (No. 02-371).
See, e.g., John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 1647 (6th
ed. 2000) (reviewing cases discussing "content neutrality" and "time, place, and man-
ner" regulation of speech).
01 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002).
'02 State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 865 (Ohio 2001).
" The Supreme Court subsequently denied the City's petition for certiorari. City of
Cincinnati v. Johnson, 539 U.S. 915 (2003).
10952005] Relocating Disorder
1096 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 91:1075
travel" claim, a court must contend with the "more specific provi-
sion" rule of Graham v. Connor.1" This rule provides that "[w]here
a particular Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government
behavior, 'that amendment, not the more generalized notion of'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these
claims."" 5 Thus if, as Cincinnati claimed, the inability to enter an
exclusion zone is a governmental "seizure," then the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness test-rather than strict scrutiny-"provides the exclusive analytical framework to assess" the restric-
tions imposed by neighborhood-exclusion zones.' °6
Assuming that the exclusion is not a "seizure," neighborhood-
exclusion zones only restrict the freedom to travel intrastate. The
Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized the right of intra-
state travel."7 As recently as 1999, a majority of the Court declined
to join an opinion articulating this right;"° in other decisions, a ma-
jority of the Court arguably has rejected it in dicta." And the fed-
104Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
"'Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395).
'J6johnson, 310 F.3d at 491. The federal courts are divided over whether post-arrest
travel restrictions constitute continuing seizures. See Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 861
(5th Cir. 1999) (endorsing seizure theory); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217,
222-25 (3d Cir. 1998) (same); Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 946 (2d Cir. 1997)
(same). But see Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004) (re-
jecting seizure rule); Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1052-54 n.3 (7th Cir.
1996) (same). The Sixth Circuit distinguished post-arrest travel restrictions from the
exclusions, reasoning that parolees were "seized" by orders requiring them to appear
for trial. Johnson, 310 F.3d at 491; see also Albright, 510 U.S. at 279 (1994) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring) ("[A] defendant released pretrial is ... still 'seized' in the constitution-
ally relevant sense... so long as he is bound to appear in court and answer for the
state's charges.").
107 See Johnson, 310 F.3d at 496-97 (noting that "the Supreme Court has not ex-
pressly recognized a fundamental right to intrastate travel"). The right of interstate
travel is firmly established. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999); United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,757 (1966).
" See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (plurality opinion) (assert-
ing that the Due Process Clause guarantees the right to intrastate travel).
See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 277 (1993) (observ-
ing that "a purely intrastate restriction does not implicate the right of interstate
travel"); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974) (declin-
ing to decide whether the constitution protects intrastate travel but expressing skepti-
cism that it does). But see Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (noting that
an anti-loitering law "implicates consideration of the constitutional right to freedom
of movement").
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eral courts of appeals remain divided on the issue.1"' Indeed, only a
few months before invalidating the Cincinnati law, a different
panel of the Sixth Circuit rejected a right-to-travel challenge to a
public-housing authority's "no trespass" policy, reasoning "that
right is essentially a right of interstate travel. ' .. Finally, even if the
Court were to endorse a right to intrastate travel, criminal behavior
frequently results in the curtailment of constitutional rights. Just as
presumptively constitutional travel restrictions are routinely im-
posed as a condition for parole or probation, a city also may be
permitted to restrict the movement of individuals as a result of
drug arrests. "2
Associational Rights. The Sixth Circuit also ruled that Cincin-
nati's exclusion-zone policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment
right of intimate association as it applied to two individuals ex-
cluded from the "Over-the-Rhine" neighborhood (which was des-
ignated the city's first drug-exclusion zone in 1998)."13 The plaintiffs
each claimed that their exclusions interfered with important per-
sonal relationships-one was prevented from helping to rear her
grandchildren and another from visiting his attorney.' In contrast,
the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a freedom-of-association chal-
lenge to the Cincinnati ordinance because the plaintiff failed to es-
tablish that his exclusion actually interfered with his associational
rights. '15 Such "as-applied" problems presumably could be ad-
dressed by an appropriate variance provision. '
110 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 536-39 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(discussing division in circuits and expressing skepticism that the right to intrastate
travel is fundamental); Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding that a curfew implicated the "fundamental right of free movement").
.. See Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2001).
1"2 See, e.g., Alonzo v. Rozanski, 808 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a parolee
has no right to travel); Bagley v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1983) (same).
113 See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984) (recognizing the right to "enter
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships" as a core liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment).
114 Johnson, 310 F.3d at 489, 500.
'" State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 862-63 (Ohio 2001).
... See Johnson, 310 F.3d at 488 (noting that variances were available to those who
were employed or resided in the exclusion zone and for "reasons relating to the
health, welfare, or well-being of the person excluded"). Plaintiffs also have asserted
that exclusions violate the First Amendment right of "expressive association." The
Court, however, has previously rejected such challenges to content-neutral laws that
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Double Jeopardy Claims. Plaintiffs also have claimed that exclu-
sions violated the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy clause. 7
Because Double Jeopardy is implicated only when an individual is
subjected to multiple criminal punishments for the same offense,
the relevant question is whether an exclusion is a criminal or civil
penalty."8 The initial determination turns on the legislature's in-
tent," 9 and courts considering both the Portland and Cincinnati
laws have found that exclusion zones' purpose is civil-to restore
the quality of life for residents in drug-plagued neighborhoods. 0
These same courts part company, however, with respect to the sec-
ond inquiry: whether the statutory scheme was "so punitive either
in purpose or in effect as to transform what was clearly intended as
a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."'' 1 Yet the social-norms justi-
fications for drug-exclusion laws weigh heavily against concluding
that an exclusion is an additional criminal penalty. The exclusions
seek to shore up the informal social norms that reject drug-related
disorder by signaling that the community does not tolerate drug of-
fenders.
Even considering the serious constitutional concerns raised by
neighborhood-exclusion zones, disorder-relocation strategies entail
less legal risk than their order-maintenance policing alternatives.
Officials can safely presume that a decision to establish homeless
campuses or conduct a regulatory sweep will not become em-
broiled in litigation. A narrowly drawn exclusion-zone policy
should also survive review. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that
limit where individuals may associate. See Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)
("It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person un-
dertakes-for example, walking down the street... but such a kernel is not sufficient
to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.").
" U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall be ... subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.").
See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
19 Id. at 99.
2See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 748 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(finding that the purpose of the Cincinnati ordinance was civil in nature), affd 310
F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002); State v. James, 978 P.2d 415, 419 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) ("It is




local government officials are turning to disorder-relocation strate-
gies with increasing frequency.
III. HISTORICAL DISORDER-RELOCATION STRATEGIES
Local efforts to relocate urban disorder are nothing new. For
many generations, police officers served as informal "urban disor-
der regulators," variously employing both disorder-concentration
and disorder-dispersal strategies. What is mostly new about the
policies discussed above is that they incorporate disorder-
relocation strategies into official land-use policy. In an effort to
learn what the historical experience with the informal policies of
the past might teach about formal efforts to relocate disorder, this
Part examines past disorder-relocation efforts in three contexts:
first the maintenance and later destruction of "skid row"
neighborhoods; second, the similar pattern of containment and
dispersal of "red light" districts, and third, the construction and
current demolition of high-rise public-housing projects.
A. Skid Rows
"Homelessness" is nothing new. The development of "skid
rows"' 22 to serve the needs of a subset of the homeless population,
121
however, has been called a uniquely American phenomenon.
Skid rows developed in the years after the Civil War, when wide-
spread economic dislocation left many people homeless and poor.
124
By the late nineteenth century, most American urban centers had a
skid row."z Skid row populations likely peaked between 1880 and
1920-a time when rapid industrialization, the railroads, and the
opening of the West created demand for transient workers. Skid
112 The term "skid row" apparently originated with the "skid road" used to drag logs
into Seattle's Puget Sound. See David Levinson, Skid Row in Transition, 3 Urb. An-
thropology 79, 80 n.1 (1974).
123 See Howard M. Bahr, Skid Row: An Introduction to Disaffiliation 31 (1973)
("Homelessness may be as old as civilization, but skid row is an American inven-
tion.").
124 See, e.g., id. at 35-36; Levinson, supra note 122, at 81.
125 See Bahr, supra note 123, at 27 (noting that most cities in the United States had a
skid row); Charles Hoch & Robert A. Slayton, New Homeless and Old: Community
and the Skid Row Hotel 14 (1989) (noting that "SRO [single-room-occupancy hotel]
districts ... existed in just about every urban center").
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rows emerged to serve as lodging and employment centers for this
large, transient, male population.126 In addition to inexpensive ac-
commodations, skid row neighborhoods also featured employment
agencies and other businesses serving the workers.127
Skid rows always were unquestionably disorderly places. High
concentrations of bars, burlesque shows, and the ubiquitous pres-
ence of prostitutes likely made them, in many cases, indistinguish-
able from red light districts. Furthermore, while many workers on
skid row remained "homeless" for a short time, a distinct subclass
lived transient, unattached lives in "hobohemia" for many years."
Most of these men were employed much of the time, but available
work was never permanent and tended to be seasonal.9 As a re-
sult, many thousands of men had significant leisure time to fre-
quent the skid row establishments that catered to the needs and
desires of unattached, single men. Moreover, other groups of un-
attached men lived on skid row-including "tramps" ("migratory
non-workers") and "bums" ("stationary non-workers")."' Despite
the tendency in some circles to idealize this lifestyle, most main-
stream accounts depicted skid rows as dangerous and depressing
places, and urban officials made efforts to prevent them from en-
croaching upon respectable parts of town.132
126 See Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 1208; Levinson,
supra note 122, at 81 (describing early skid rows); John C. Schneider, Skid Row as an
Urban Neighborhood, 1880-1960, 9 Urbanism Past & Present 11-13 (1984) (describ-
ing skid row in its heyday).
27 See Nels Anderson, The Hobo: The Sociology of the Homeless Man 87, 250-60
(1923) (describing Chicago missions); Hoch & Slayton, supra note 125, at 10-20 (de-
scribing transient housing); id. at 32-34 (describing saloons, cafes, second-hand stores,
pawn brokers, burlesque theaters, and brothels); Levinson, supra note 122, at 81 (de-
scribing skid row employment agencies).
128 See, e.g., Hoch & Slayton, supra note 125, at 35 (describing the temporary nature
of homelessness); Levinson, supra note 122, at 82-83 (discussing "hobo" culture).
12'Hoch & Slayton, supra note 125, at 39 (noting that "[tihe most important aspect
of a hobo's life, besides travel, was his occupation and the fact that he was constantly
working").
30 See id. at 40.
131 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 127, at 87 (quoting St. John Tucker, former presi-
dent of the "Hobo College" in Chicago).
132 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 127, at 163 ("The average man on the street...
sees in the tramp either a parasite or a predacious individual."); Hoch & Slayton, su-
pra note 125, at 44-45 (describing, and questioning, the "public perception of the
hobo, tramp, and bum ... [that] emphasized social disorder, chaos, and the threat to
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Still, skid row in its heyday likely was a vibrant-if disorderly-
community. Contemporary accounts depicted busy sidewalks full
of migratory workers who found employment and camaraderie
there.'33 These economic and social conditions stand in stark con-
trast to the later declining skid rows, which were "in the minds of
both the public and the academic community ... very different and
more deviant place[s]."'' Skid rows began to decline around 1920
and their populations fell precipitously after World War I." The
raw numbers, however, tell only part of the story. While skid row
always had been associated with social deviancy, and especially al-
cohol abuse,'" after World War II, these factors became the area's
defining characteristics.'37 Several major studies of post-war skid
rows all presented the same picture of dire conditions-extreme
poverty, disability, alcoholism, mental illness, and social isolation.'
These studies also vividly illustrate how skid row came to be
viewed as a land-use problem.'39 For decades, city officials primarily
had regulated skid row in the same way that urban disorder had
been addressed throughout American history-through order-
maintenance policing."4 In his classic study, Egon Bittner asserted
that "the traditional attitude of civic-mindedness toward skid row
community"); Schneider, supra note 126, at 12 (describing an 1898 Omaha police raid
on a gambling den that had crossed the "line of respectability").
"' Anderson, supra note 127, at 3-13. But see Peter H. Rossi, Down and Out In
America: The Origins of Homelessness 21 n.6 (1989) (noting that Anderson later ex-
pressed regret for over-glamorizing hobo life).
'34Hoch & Slayton, supra note 125, at 88.
'3" See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 133, at 32 (noting that skid row populations declined
by fifty percent between 1950 and 1970); Schneider, supra note 126, at 15 (discussing
decline).
" See Hoch & Slayton, supra note 125, at 45 (discussing "alcoholism, thievery, and
other socially deviant tendencies" on skid rows).
'" See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 126, at 15 (comparing hobos and tramps-"rough
workingmen or social misfits who simply overindulged in low-life saloons"-with the
skid row man of the 1950s-"a hopeless alcoholic, enslaved by his addiction to the
point where he was totally unproductive"); see also Joan K. Jackson & Ralph Connor,
The Skid Road Alcoholic, 14 Q.J. Stud. on Alcohol 468 (1958); W. Jack Peterson &
Milton A. Maxwell, The Skid Road "Wino," 5 Soc. Probs. 308 (1958).
"' See Rossi, supra note 133, at 28-31 (discussing studies); see also Howard M. Bahr
& Theodore Caplow, Old Men, Drunk and Sober (1974) (New York's Bowery); Leo-
nard Blumberg et al., Skid Row and Its Alternatives (1973) (Philadelphia's Skid
Row); Donald J. Bogue, Skid Row in American Cities (1963) (Chicago).
131 See Rossi, supra note 133, at 28-33 (summarizing the studies' findings).
'40 See Anderson, supra note 127, at 165.
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has been dominated by the desire to contain it and to salvage souls
from its clutches. The specific task of containment has been left to
the police."'' As skid row declined, however, police officers, faced
with more severe social deviancy and greater societal hostility, felt
pressure to exercise a greater amount of control within skid row as
well.' 2 While police remained more tolerant of disorder on skid
row than elsewhere, "sweeps" to clean up the areas became more
frequent occurrences.'43 By the mid-1960s, the skid row contain-
ment strategy had unraveled. Indeed, most post-war studies fo-
cused on how to address the dislocations resulting from skid row
demolitions.'"
While most skid rows have disappeared, homelessness has not.
A number of commentators have asserted that the demise of skid
rows fueled the homelessness crisis of the 1980s by reducing the
supply of affordable housing ' and dispersing the homeless."'
Moreover, skid row containment policies were abandoned at
roughly the same time that public-order offenses were decriminal-
ized. As a result, "the public could observe first hand shabbily
dressed persons acting in bizarre ways, muttering, shouting and
carrying bulky packages, or pushing supermarket carts filled with
junk and old clothes." ' 7 As the homeless became more visible, city
officials and nonprofit service providers struggled to find ways to
address their needs. Politically progressive, middle-class religious
congregations replaced skid row missions, with some congregations
intentionally locating soup kitchens in more affluent areas to draw
... Bittner, supra note 22, at 704; see also Hoch & Slayton, supra note 125, at 105
("[T]he job of the patrolman was primarily to maintain the spatial order by seeing
that the accepted boundaries of Skid Row were maintained. This was done by confin-
ing the men to their specific neighborhood and prohibiting spillover into middle-class
sections." (internal quotations omitted)).
" See Schneider, supra note 126, at 17 (noting that officers were pressured to main-
tain more street decorum than in the past).
"' See Hoch & Slayton, supra note 125, at 104-05 (noting increased control within
skid row).
See Rossi, supra note 133, at 28-29 (discussing the objectives of the studies).
See Christopher Jencks, The Homeless 61-74 (1994) (linking the decline in the
number of SRO units to homelessness).
, See Rossi, supra note 133, at 33-34 (noting that the bizarre behavior of the home-
less was previously "acted out on Skid Row"); see also Levinson, supra note 122, at 88
(linking the destruction of skid row with the dispersal of homeless populations).
' Rossi, supra note 133, at 34.
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attention to the homeless problem." As a result, problems previ-
ously concentrated on skid row began to affect more "respectable"
communities.149
By the early 1990s, this kind of dispersed disorder began to gen-
erate a backlash against the homeless. Commentators wrote of
"compassion fatigue," and cities passed ordinances cracking down
on homelessness-related disorder, particularly panhandling and
sleeping in public places. "' Furthermore, growing endorsement of
the "broken windows" hypothesis led some leaders to see the
homeless as an impediment to renewal efforts. Through the crea-
tion of "campuses," homeless policy seemingly has come full circle,
as local governments seek to formally reestablish skid row con-
tainment strategies.
B. Red Light Districts
Local governments' efforts to control sexually-oriented busi-
nesses have followed a similar pattern of disorder concentration,
followed by dispersal. Traditionally, the "sex industry" was concen-
trated in special disorder zones known colloquially as red light dis-
tricts. As with skid rows, these containment policies were-with a
few notable exceptions-informal in nature. Also, as with skid
rows, the informal containment compromise unraveled when un-
ruly red light districts came to be viewed as a threat to the cities'
greater welfare. In response to that concern, economic and legal
forces combined to eliminate the red light districts and disperse
their concentrated disorder. The remainder of this Part examines
this pattern of regulation in two related contexts: First, the munici-
pal "vice districts" of the early twentieth century, and second, the
regulation and eventual disappearance of red light districts with
high concentrations of sexually-oriented businesses.
See Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 1215.
", Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Cmty. Serv., 712 P.2d 914 (Ariz.
1985) (enjoining a soup kitchen's operation because of the patrons' effect on
neighboring residents).
Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 1167-68.
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1. Municipal Vice Districts
Some Western European nations have designated official "vice
zones" within which prostitution is tolerated. While this practice
has been rare in U.S. history, several American cities created offi-
cial municipal vice districts in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries."' The best known example is New Orleans' "Story-
ville," which was created by an 1897 ordinance confining brothels
to a narrow area of the city."' St. Louis, Missouri, and several
Texas cities also established similar districts around the turn of the
twentieth century."' Technically, prostitution remained a crime
within these districts, but lax enforcement approximated legaliza-
tion."'
All of these districts were eliminated by the advent of World
War I for reasons related to the predictable consequences of con-
centrating disorder. In Texas, a state law encouraged cities to cre-
ate vice districts by providing that a private nuisance lawsuit could
not "'interfere with the control and regulation of bawds and bawdy
houses ... confined by ordinance ... within a designated district."" 5
When the aggrieved neighbors of brothels challenged this exemp-
tion, the courts ruled that the cities had effectively and illegally au-
thorized prostitution." Moral outcry led to the demise of the St.
Louis vice district only four years after its creation in 1870 ." Story-
ville lasted longer. In 1900, the Supreme Court rejected a quasi-
takings challenge claiming that the ordinance had resulted in an in-
crease in disorderly and immoral behavior and diminished adjacent
"' See Gerald L. Neuman, Anomolous Zones, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1197, 1209 (1996).
5 Id.
153 See Thomas C. Mackey, Red Lights Out: A Legal History of Prostitution, Disor-
derly Houses, and Vice Districts, 1870-1917 at 124-32 (1987).
See Neuman, supra note 151, at 1211.
"'Id. (quoting 1911 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 4689).
'5 See Baker v. Coman, 198 S.W. 141, 141 (Tex. 1917) (invalidating a Houston ordi-
nance); Spence v. Fenchler, 180 S.W. 597, 602-03 (Tex. 1915) (invalidating an El Paso
ordinance); Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. City of Dallas, 137 S.W. 342, 343 (Tex.
1911) (invalidating a Dallas ordinance); Burton v. Dupree, 46 S.W. 272, 273 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1898) (invalidating a Waco ordinance).
5 See Joel Best, Controlling Vice: Regulating Brothel Prostitution in St. Paul,
1865-1883, at 17 (1998).
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property values."' Concerns about disorder did, however, lead the
Navy to close Storyville in 1917 in order to preserve the health and
good order of American servicemen.9
While the formal designation of vice districts was relatively rare,
most large cities had large, quasi-official vice districts during this
same time period."6 The police contained prostitution through se-
lective arrests, turning a blind eye to solicitation within these dis-
tricts, but arresting prostitutes elsewhere. 6 ' Respectable society ac-
cepted this compromise because it shielded other neighborhoods
from prostitution.162 Nevertheless, prostitution-related disorder was
amplified within these districts, where theft, physical abuse of pros-
titutes, and even violence spawned by inter-brothel rivalries was
commonplace. '63 Despite the disorder, and the concerted efforts of
Progressive-era "social hygiene" reformers to eliminate prostitu-
tion,"6 most vice districts remained intact until the second decade
of the twentieth century. At that point, Progressives joined forces
with Prohibitionists to pass "red light abatement acts" that author-
ized private citizens to file a complaint against any building used
for prostitution. These acts, combined with increased demand for
police enforcement, meant the end of the vice districts.165
Eliminating vice districts did not, however, eliminate prostitu-
tion. Rather, prostitutes were dispersed, exposing more neighbor-
.5 See L'Hote v. City of New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 594-600 (1900) (rejecting the
plaintiff's claim that the decline in property values resulting from Storyville's creation
was a deprivation of property without due process).
... See Mark Thomas Connelly, The Response to Prostitution in the Progressive Era
136-50 (1980); Neuman, supra note 151, at 1211.
" See John F. Decker, Prostitution: Regulation and Control 61-62 (1979).
161 See, e.g., Best, supra note 157, at 19.
'62 See, e.g., Neil Larry Shumsky, Tacit Acceptance: Respectable Americans and
Segregated Prostitution, 1870-1910, 19 J. Soc. Hist. 665, 665-79 (1986).
163 Best, supra note 157, at 28-30; see also L'Hote, 177 U.S. at 590 (describing Story-
ville as "the refuge of public prostitutes, lewd and abandoned women and the neces-
sary attendants thereof, drunkards, idle, vicious and disorderly persons").
'See Ruth Rosen, The Lost Sisterhood: Prostitution in America, 1900-1918, at 14-
376t1982).
16 See Decker, supra note 160, at 67; Rosen, supra note 164, at 30 ("In most cases,
however, the chief of police responded to civic pressure simply by ordering the closing
of the district."). Federal policy also played a role. As the United States prepared to
enter the First World War, Congress authorized the military to arrest any prostitute
operating within five miles of a military cantonment. Id. at 33-34; see also McKinley
v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919) (affirming the defendant's conviction for operat-
ing "houses of ill fame" within the prohibited area).
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hoods to the "oldest profession." Street walking-long viewed as
the most disorderly and dangerous form of the trade-became
commonplace. Tea rooms, massage parlors, and palm reading es-
tablishments became fronts for prostitution rings."6 Prostitution
became more difficult to regulate as control shifted from the mad-
ams and police to pimps and organized crime syndicates.'67
2. "Adult- Use" Districts
Underground prostitution undoubtedly took root in the adult-
use districts that developed during the last century. As with their
vice district predecessors, these areas featured high concentrations
of sexually-oriented businesses-adult book stores, pornographic
movie theaters, peep shows, exotic dance clubs, massage parlors,
etc.'" New York's Times Square epitomized the extent of the dis-
order present in these areas. By the 1970s, visitors encountered "a
smorgasbord of books, magazines, films, peep shows,... stripteases,
and even live sex performances," many of which concealed prosti-
tution as well.'69 The area also became flooded with criminal activ-
ity-so much so that 42nd Street alone "recorded more than twice
as many criminal complaints as any other street in the area, with
drug offenses, grand larceny, robbery, and assault topping the
list." 70
Most adult-use districts, including Times Square, resulted from
an informal "containment" strategy similar to the vice district
model:17' Order-maintenance policing, rather than formal land-use
policy, was used to regulate and contain the sex industry. A few cit-
ies, however, adopted formal land-use policies establishing adult-
'66 Best, supra note 157, at 112-13; Decker, supra note 160, at 73; Rosen, supra note
164, at 32-33.
167 See Best, supra note 157, at 113 (arguing that the demise of vice districts in-
creased corruption and the role of organized crime); Rosen, supra note 164, at 33 (de-
scribing the role of organized crime in prostitution).
" See Alexander J. Reich], Reconstructing Times Square: Politics and Culture in
Urban Development 57 (1999) (describing New York City's Times Square in the
1970s).
169 Id.
70 Lynne B. Sagalyn, Times Square Roulette: Remaking the City Icon 31 (2001).




use districts. 172 The best known example is Boston's "Combat
Zone," which was designated the "adult use entertainment district"
in 1974.' Unfortunately, after the containment strategy was for-
malized, the crime and disorder in the Combat Zone skyrocketed.
Whereas prostitution, gambling, and the hard core obscenity were
already present in the area, the "official" designation that these ac-
tivities belonged there led to a rapid erosion of any discretion pre-
viously exercised by its purveyors. Norman Marcus, then counsel
for the New York City Planning Commission, cautioned against
emulating this model, warning that a sense of "criminal license"
prevailed in the Combat Zone.74 Moreover, neighboring areas, es-
pecially Chinatown, suffered serious economic and social conse-
quences from disorder spillovers. 7'
Over the past few decades, adult-use districts gradually have dis-
appeared as a result of the same economic and legal forces that
precipitated the elimination of skid rows and vice districts. Impor-
tantly, the districts' downtown locations have subjected them to the
pressure of urban redevelopment efforts. Some, such as Albany's
"Gut," were razed during the urban renewal period as local offi-
cials came under increasing pressure to quell the disorder within
them.76 More recently, after decades of failed efforts, private and
public forces combined to transform the Combat Zone and Times
Square.177 Urban-development expert Lynne Sagalyn recently de-
scribed the "new" Times Square as an "internationally recognized
symbol of urban redemption.' 171 In 2003, only two adult businesses
remained in the Combat Zone.79
172 See Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153 (Wash. 1978) (upholding a
Seattle law that confined adult motion picture theaters to a specified district).
113 Lawrence W. Kennedy, Planning the City Upon a Hill: Boston Since 1630, at 208
(1992).
"'Norman Marcus, Zoning Obscenity: Or, the Moral Politics of Porn, 27 Buff. L.
Rev. 1, 3-4 (1979).
175 See Shirley Leung, Chinatown Enjoys a Renaissance, Boston Globe, Apr. 9, 1997,
at Al.
"' See Wilson, supra note 21, at 240 (noting that the "Gut" was torn down because it
"was receiving too much unfavorable publicity").
177 See Kennedy, supra note 173, at 208-09 (describing efforts in Boston); Reichl,
supra note 168, at 58-61 (describing efforts in New York).
" See Sagalyn, supra note 170, at 7.
17 See Steve Bailey, Build 'Em High, Boston Globe, Dec. 17, 2003, at C1.
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While zoning laws were rarely used to create red light districts,
they have contributed to the districts' demise, thanks in part to the
Supreme Court. The Court's decisions extending First Amendment
protection to sexually explicit materials undoubtedly contributed
to the growth of red light districts in the 1960s and 1970s. 8 0 But
later decisions permit cities to use zoning laws to control the "sec-
ondary effects" of sexually-oriented businesses, either by dispers-
ing or concentrating them.' The proliferation of "secondary ef-
fects" studies focusing on the negative consequences of
concentrations of adult businesses provides strong anecdotal evi-
dence suggesting that most cities have opted for dispersal. 2 A pre-
dictable consequence of these policies has been, in the words of
one commentator, "pornosprawl."'' 3 Communities without disper-
sal zoning find themselves inundated with adult businesses pushed
out of major cities. As a result, many smaller cities and suburbs
now must find ways to address the pornography-related disorder
that large urban centers have rejected.
C. High-Rise Public Housing
It is hard to imagine a more powerful monument to a failed dis-
order-concentration strategy than the crumbling towers of the
Robert Taylor Homes. Featured in the 1970's-hit sitcom "Good
Times," the Taylor Homes's twenty-eight buildings comprised the
nation's largest public-housing project upon their completion in
1962. These "towers in the park" once lined a two-mile stretch of
Chicago's Dan Ryan Expressway across from the White Sox's Co-
misky Park. The Taylor Homes are almost gone now, thanks to the
" See, e.g., Reichl, supra note 168, at 57 (arguing that constitutional protection for
pornography facilitated the growth of the commercial sex industry in Times Square).... See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1985) (upholding a
zoning ordinance that had the effect of concentrating adult motion picture theatres);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976) (upholding a zoning
law that prohibited adult businesses from locating "within 1,000 feet of any two other
'regulated uses' or within 500 feet of a residential area").
See Community Defense Counsel, Protecting Children and their Neighborhoods,
Secondary Effects Studies (2004), at http://www.communitydfense.org/cdcdocs/landuse/
secondaryeffects (last accessed Apr. 16, 2005) (collecting secondary effects studies).
183 See Ellen Perlman, Pornosprawl: X-Rated Businesses are Leaving the City for
the Suburbs: The Suburbs Aren't Ready, Governing Mag., Oct. 1997, available at
http: //www.governing.com/archive/1997/oct/porn.txt.
federal government's massive "Hope VI" program, which funds
the demolition of urban-renewal-era public-housing projects and
their partial replacement with low-rise, mixed-income projects.
Only five of the original buildings remain; all of them will be closed
by the end of 2005.'
Unlike red light districts and skid rows, of course, high-rise pub-
lic-housing projects never were maintained solely to concentrate
urban disorder. A complex array of social, ideological, and eco-
nomic factors resulted in the Taylor Homes. Still, high concentra-
tions of poverty-related disorder were the foreordained result of
post-war federal public-housing policy, for a number of reasons.
First, federal law mandated the elimination of one unit of substan-
dard housing for every unit built, a requirement that virtually guar-
anteed that most public-housing units would be built in urban ar-
eas.' Second, most high rises were built at a time when city
planners favored "towers in the park"-style buildings-both be-
cause they sadly were influenced by LeCourbusier' 6 and because
they sought to minimize the space consumed by low-income dwell-
ings. '87 Third, other federal policies-especially reserving public-
housing units for the most needy and the failing to allocate ade-
quate renovation funds-led to high concentrations of destitute
families in rapidly deteriorating buildings."
By the late 1980s-after over two decades of efforts to de-
concentrate public-housing tenants'--crime and disorder had
" See Chi. Hous. Auth., Robert Taylor Homes (2003) at http://
thecha.org/housingdev/robert-taylor.html (last accessed Apr. 16, 2005).
1" See Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go from Here?,
60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 497, 504 (1993) (describing federal housing laws).
" LeCorbusier's "Radiant City" proposal called for high-rise residential towers in
parks set on superblocks. See LeCorbusier, The City of Tomorrow and Its Planning
280 (1924); see also Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 955 (5th ed. 2002)
("LeCorbusier's ideas had an immense impact on public housing.").
,81 See Bernard J. Frieden & Lynne B. Sagalyn, Downtown, Inc.: How America Re-
builds Cities 23 (1989) (arguing that "city renewal directors were searching for 'the
blight that's right'-places just bad enough to clear but good enough to attract devel-
opers").
"8 See Schill, supra note 185, at 501-13 (discussing factors contributing to housing
distress).
"'The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 required public-housing
authorities to avoid concentrations of low-income and deprived families with serious
social problems. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
383, § 101(c)(6), 88 Stat. 633, 634-35 (1974). Since the early 1970s, federal housing as-
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come to define high-rise projects." In 1989, Congress established
the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing
to address these problems.' The Commission's final report found
that six percent of public housing-roughly 86,000 units-was se-
verely distressed.92 Moreover, the Commission found that all pub-
lic-housing residents were "very poor and getting poorer," a reality
that translated into "an aggregation of particularly vulnerable
households in many family developments" as well as "tremendous
isolation" and "[i]nstitutional abandonment" of the most distressed
projects.'93
Congress responded by appropriating $300 million for the "Ur-
ban Revitalization Demonstration" project, or what is now known
as "Hope VI."' 94 After operating for several years as a demonstra-
tion project, the Hope VI program was authorized for the first time
in the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998,195
which solidified the preference for de-concentrating the disorders
associated with public housing. Perhaps most significantly, the 1998
Act eliminated the requirement that public-housing authorities re-
place demolished public-housing on a one-for-one basis,1 96 thus
sistance also has shifted to favor demand-oriented programs that enable poor tenants
to rent apartments on the private market in particular. See Schill, supra note 185, at
524-25.
'" See Schill, supra note 185, at 497-98 (describing popular accounts of problems of
public housing).
191 See id., at 498; see also Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-235, §§ 501-07, 103 Stat. 1987, 2048-52.
19' See Nat'l Comm'n on Severely Distressed Pub. Hous., The Final Report 2-3
(1992) (finding that three conditions characterized the most distressed developments:
"[r]esidents living in despair and generally needing high levels of social and support
services"; "physically deteriorating buildings"; and "[e]conomically and socially dis-
tressed surrounding communities").
93 Id. at 47-48.
194See U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev., Hope VI Program Authority and Fund-
ing History (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/
hope6/about/fundinghistory.pdf (noting that Hope VI was an immediate response to
the Commission's findings) (last accessed July 12, 2005).
"' Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112
Stat. 2518 (codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.); see also Patrick E. Clancy &
Leo Quigley, Hope VI: A Vital Tool for Comprehensive Neighborhood Revitaliza-
tion, 8 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 527 (2001) (describing and defending Hope VI).
' Louise Hunt et al., Summary of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility
Act of 1998, at 11 (1998), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/phr/
about/titlev.pdf.
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clearing the way for the demolition of high-rise projects and their
replacement with privately managed, less dense, mixed-income de-
velopments. '97 Increased reliance on demand-oriented housing sub-
sidies is a necessary corollary to this policy; displaced tenants must
be given housing vouchers to replace demolished apartments that
will not be replaced.
These Hope VI projects generally are viewed as a success in the
popular press. '98 Critics, however, assert that the program is a costly
and unjust disorder-dispersal device. The program, in this view,
"succeeds" by depriving the neediest tenants of the resources that
they need to secure housing and forcing them to resettle in equally
dangerous and segregated communities."9 Empirical studies tend to
paint a more hopeful picture of displaced tenants relocating to
wealthier, more diverse, and safer neighborhoods-albeit to ones
that remain relatively poor, segregated, and dangerous. These re-
sults hold true across all three categories of displaced tenants-
those returning to public housing, those using Housing Choice
Vouchers, and those who are unsubsidized renters.
2l
97 See Clancy & Quigley, supra note 195, at 528-30 (describing Hope VI program-
matic focus).
198 For recent commentary, see, for example, Jeanette Almada, Construction Begins
on Roosevelt Square Project, Chi. Trib., Dec. 12, 2004, at 9; Ilene Lelchuk, Back
Home in North Beach: Residents of Project Glad to Return After Renovation, S.F.
Chron., Oct. 2, 2004, at B1; Brigid Schulte, New Public Housing Courts Middle-
Income Tenants; Chatham Square Replaces the Berg, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 2004, at
T3; Eric Siegel, For O'Malley, a Legacy in Improvement, Balt. Sun, Sept. 16, 2004, at
2B; Leslie Williams, Home Sweet Home: Old St. Thomas Site Blooms, City Officials
Open River Garden, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Nov. 17, 2004, at 1.
,, See, e.g., Michael S. FitzPatrick, Note, A Disaster in Every Generation: An
Analysis of Hope VI, HUD's Newest Big Budget Development Plan, 7 Geo. J. on
Poverty L. & Pol'y 421 (2000) (summarizing these arguments); Nat'l Hous. Law Pro-
ject, False Hope: A Critical Assessment of the Hope VI Public Housing Redevelop-
ment Program (2002), available at http://www.nhlp.org; Nat'l Alliance of HUD Ten-
ants, Report on the Loss of Subsidized Housing in the U.S. (2002), available at
http://www.saveourhomes.org/Senate-Report.htm (summarizing data showing the
loss of subsidized housing attributable to Hope VI).
" See, e.g., Larry Buron, An Improved Living Environment? Neighborhood Out-
comes for Hope VI Relocatees, Metropolitan Housing and Community Center,
Brief No. 3, 1-2 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.urban.org/Tem-
plate.cfm?Section=ByAuthor&NavMenulD=63&template=/TaggedContent/Vie
wPublication.cfm&PublicationlD=898
4 ("Our findings indicate that relocatees
generally moved to neighborhoods with lower levels of poverty, slightly more racial
diversity, and significantly less criminal activity.").
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In each of the contexts discussed above, local authorities initially
sought to control disorder by concentrating it into "disorder
zones"-skid rows, red light districts, and high-rise projects. Con-
centration efforts usually were an unofficial compromise that
shielded respectable communities from urban disorder. Concen-
trating disorder, however, amplified it and caused spillovers that
threatened neighborhoods outside of the containment zone. Even-
tually, the disorder-concentration compromise became socially and
politically unacceptable, and government officials sought to dis-
perse disorder in order to minimize its costs.
IV. A COST OF RIGHTS PROBLEM?
Order-maintenance policing proponents argue that judicial deci-
sions preventing the police from addressing urban disorder create a
"cost of rights" problem. Echoing Justice Thomas's dissent in Chi-
cago v. Morales, they assert that legal protections designed to
shield individuals from unlikely police abuses result in a certainty
of crime and disorder in our nation's most vulnerable communi-
ties.2"' As the discussion above illustrates, disorder-relocation
strategies dodge many of the legal pitfalls of order-maintenance
policing by transferring the power to regulate disorder away from
the police. The question remains, however, whether these strate-
gies help solve the cost of rights problem. That is, do disorder-
relocation strategies reduce disorder and avoid the racial-justice
and civil-liberties concerns raised by order-maintenance policing?
This Part takes up this important question. Specifically, it asks
whether, in an effort to avoid legal challenges, local officials may
be turning to disorder-relocation strategies that impose high costs
of their own. I use the questions raised in the order-maintenance
debate-"are these policies just" and "will they work"-as guide-
posts to predict the "costs" of disorder-relocation strategies. These
questions are particularly important for two distinct reasons. First,
201 527 U.S. 41, 98, 115 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("By focusing exclusively on
the imagined 'rights' of the two percent, the Court today has denied our most vulner-
able citizens the very thing that Justice Stevens ... elevates above all else-the 'free-
dom of movement.' And that is a shame." (citation omitted)).
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both sides of the debate have endorsed them as the relevant
benchmarks for "success"; and second, the disorder-relocation
strategies discussed here are arguably being adopted in response to
them. Thus, this Part applies those questions to the disorder-
relocation strategies discussed in this Article, asking first whether
these efforts will reinvigorate the private norms necessary to curb
disorder, and second, how well they address the racial- and eco-
nomic-justice issues raised by order-maintenance opponents.
A. A Land-Use Critique of Disorder Relocation
The historical experience described above casts a shadow of
doubt upon current efforts to use formal land-use policy to relocate
disorder. Over the past century, urban policymakers discovered
that efforts to contain or disperse urban disorder impose serious
social costs. Unfortunately, there are reasons to worry that the
costs of contemporary disorder-relocation efforts that shift power
from police to land-use planners will exceed those of their histori-
cal counterparts. When police officers informally managed disor-
der, local officials could modulate the costs of relocation because
of the inherent flexibility of informality: The police exercised their
discretion to make ex post determinations about what behaviors,
and which individuals, threatened the public order.
The policies discussed in this Article seriously limit that flexibil-
ity. Disorder-relocation strategies change more than the nature of
the regulator; they also change the type of decisionmaking shaping
the order-maintenance agenda. Disorder-relocation strategies-
like all land-use regulations-require ex ante determinations of
who are the disorderly and where disorder is most harmful. A
number of legal scholars have criticized American land-use policy
precisely because it relies upon such predictive decisionmaking.
2'
Ex ante decisions designed to minimize disorder often impose high
"prevention costs"2"3 because they codify the "better safe than
sorry" principle. The predictions enshrined in zoning law, for ex-
202 See, e.g., Garnett, Home-Business Dilemma, supra note 12, at 1238 (reviewing
the literature).
203 See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 694 (1973).
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ample, are inevitably overbroad, and sometimes they are simplywrong."°
The codification of these predictions also deprives policymakers
of the flexibility needed to rapidly respond to changing circum-
stances.' I previously have argued that cities may make a serious
mistake by assuming that existing land-use. policies-especially
zoning laws designed to carefully segregate private land uses-
suppress disorder. This assumption is deeply rooted in American
law. In recent years, however, an increasing number of urban plan-
ners have come to endorse the view, identified strongly with the
work of Jane Jacobs, that such policies undermine vibrant, healthy,
urban environments. Nearly a century of tinkering with regulations
ordering private land uses has, in this view, largely failed: While
the persistence of these "order-construction" regulations results in
part from a desire to make our cities orderly, a strong case can be
made that they in fact contribute to the disorder that plagues our
cities and undergird the renewed interest in order-maintenance po-
licing."° If relying on existing land-use policies to order our cities
does more harm than good, then new land-use policies explicitly
adopted to relocate disorder may compound the previous error.
B. Disorder Relocation as Disorder Suppression
Admittedly, however, these critiques of private land-use regula-
tions are not directly applicable to the disorder-relocation policies
examined in this Article. Perhaps policies adopted with the express
intent of acting directly to suppress disorder by relocating the dis-
orderly will prove more efficacious than private zoning efforts.
Thus, the remainder of the Section draws upon the historical ex-
perience with disorder-relocation efforts and the social-norms ar-
guments used to promote order-maintenance policing, and to
evaluate disorder-relocation efforts.
oSee Garnett, Home-Business Dilemma, supra note 12, at 1238.
... See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free En-
terprise Development System, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 28, 52 (1981) (arguing that zoning
law is "incapable of assimilating rapid changes in design, technology, or community
preferences")." See Garnett, Ordering the City, supra note 10, at 42.
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1. Disorder Concentration: The New Skid Rows
At first glace, homeless campuses seem to be an excellent re-
sponse to the criticisms of "policing" the homeless through the
criminal law. Cities seek to use the promise of services and shelter,
not the threat of arrest, to lure homeless individuals away from
downtown streets. Ideally, this disorder-relocation strategy will re-
duce the amount of police intervention needed to suppress disor-
der and, therefore, minimize the possibility that police officers may
abuse their authority. Furthermore, if, as Dan Kahan has observed,
"[p]ublic drunkenness,.., aggressive panhandling and similar be-
havior signal.., that the community is unable or unwilling to en-
force basic norms,"" then it seems self-evident that reducing such
disorder will help send the opposite signals. This likelihood is par-
ticularly important for those who worry that an absence of street
decorum drives law-abiding individuals away, thus impeding efforts
to enliven moribund central business districts. 8 In this sense, the
homeless campuses can be seen as part of a broader movement to
create local government institutions that will help reinvigorate de-
caying downtown neighborhoods.' While new "sublocal" govern-
ments, like business improvement districts, enable downtown
property owners to solve collective-action problems and tackle the
physical (and to a lesser extent social) disorders that plague rede-
velopment efforts,21 homeless campuses seek to minimize down-
town disorder by concentrating it away from city centers.
If the only goal of order-maintenance policies were to encourage
downtown redevelopment, or perhaps the gentrification of some
urban residential neighborhoods, then disorder-concentration ef-
207Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 11, at 370.
2See Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 1174 ("[C]hronic
panhandlers, bench squatters, and other disorderly people may deter some citizens
from gathering in the agora."); Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 15, at 823 ("If
they can, law-abiding citizens are likely to leave a neighborhood that is pervaded by
disorder .... Law-abiders who stick it out, moreover, are more likely to avoid the
streets, where their simple presence would otherwise be a deterrent to crime.").
2 See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82
Minn. L. Rev. 503 (1997) (discussing the emergence of new local government institu-
tions).210 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, A Government For Our Time? Business Improve-
ment Districts and Urban Governance, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 365, 377-404 (1999);




forts might "work." After all, concentration strategies long served
to shield respectable neighborhoods by drawing disorder into unre-
spectable ones. Yet the story is not so simple. Social-norms schol-
ars promise that disorder-suppression is not a zero-sum game; that
is, a reduction in disorder in one neighborhood need not mean an
increase in disorder elsewhere. According to the social-influence
theory, disorder suppression should have a multiplier effect. Gov-
ernment intervention to curb disorder will bolster private efforts to
do the same. The result will be less disorder everywhere.
But, history suggests that disorder concentration often is, in fact,
a zero-sum game. Relocating homeless services (and their patrons)
may well make central business districts healthier, more vibrant
places, but the cost of reducing disorder downtown may be increas-
ing it elsewhere. Indeed, concentration strategies tend to amplify
disorder. Policymakers who informally maintained disorder zones
accepted the higher level of disorder within them to prevent the
erosion of norms of order elsewhere. Eventually, however, the am-
plified disorder that resulted led them to switch from a concentra-
tion to a dispersal strategy. This point is particularly important be-
cause proponents promise that order-restoration efforts will not
just save downtown, but will also save the poorest, most disorder-
plagued urban communities. Sadly, these communities are the least
likely to be shielded from disorder by a concentration strategy.
A homeless campus is a classic "LULU" (locally undesirable
land use);..' a proposal to establish one is frequently greeted by
screams of protest from neighbors.212 These objections undoubtedly
reflect a healthy dose of "not in my backyard" or "NIMBYism"
(for example, a neighbor of Colorado Springs' proposed campus
referred to the project as "Wino Wal-Mart"). 13 But they also may
suggest that the campuses raise the economic- and racial-equity
concerns flagged by opponents of order-maintenance policing. Un-
fortunately, in order to relocate homeless individuals away from
211 See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and
the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1001, 1001 (1993)
[hereinafter Been, Fairness] (characterizing homeless shelters and drug treatment
centers-both of which may be located in campuses-as LULUs).
212 See, e.g., Erin Emery, Homeless Center Draws Praise, Ire, Denver Post, June 25,
2000, at B4 (describing a neighbor's objection to a proposed homeless campus, includ-




downtown streets, local officials may well choose to construct cam-
pus facilities in poor neighborhoods. Indeed, the "environmental
justice" literature illustrates why political decisionmakers may con-
centrate homeless services in poor minority neighborhoods, even
absent discriminatory intent. Neighborhood opposition may be
weaker, residents may have less political clout, and planners may
view their communities as "hopeless" or "unsalvageable." And,
importantly, land may be more readily available and less expensive
than in more affluent communities."
Phoenix chose to locate its campus near where existing service
providers had concentrated informally.215  Residents in the
neighborhood already suffer from so much disorder that existing
zoning laws actually discourage new social services from moving
into the area. Teachers at the local elementary school worry about
homeless men lining up in the soup kitchen line, keep students in-
side during recess to avoid contact with prostitutes, and encourage
area parents to walk their children to school after welfare checks
are distributed.216 Under these circumstances, the creation of a
homeless campus may amplify disorder in the very communities
that are least likely to have the social wherewithal to withstand an
onslaught of new disorder. This result would not only be unjust, it
may also fuel the downward spiral of disorder and decay that
plagues so many poor urban neighborhoods. Indeed, the vulner-
ability of such neighborhoods to disorder-and the weakness of so-
cial norms that might counter it-undergirds arguments in favor of
order-maintenance policies.
2' See, e.g., Vicki Been and Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the
Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 Ecology L.Q.
1, 33-34 (1997) (summarizing a study of siting decisions and finding some correlation
between LULUs and racial demographics); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land
Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103
Yale L.J. 1383, 1398-1406 (1994) [hereinafter Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses]
(concluding that evidence of disproportionate siting is mixed); Robert W. Collin, Re-
view of the Legal Literature on Environmental Racism, Environmental Equity and
Environmental Justice, J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 121 (1994) (reviewing the literature).
2. See Maricopa County, Human Services Campus: Project Info (2004), at
http://www.maricopa.gov/hscampus/status.aspx#plan (last accessed July 12, 2005)
(displaying renderings of existing providers and the proposed campus site).
26See Sarah Anchors, Agency Stirs Safety Concerns for School, Ariz. Republic,
Feb. 26, 2003, at 1.
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The history of skid row vividly illustrates what such a community
might expect from a new homeless campus. Skid row neighbor-
hoods "worked" as disorder zones under a combination of legal,
economic, and social realities that cannot be replicated today. First,
in their heyday, skid row neighborhoods served the economic and
social needs of the itinerant working poor. Skid row residents
might have been social misfits, but they were not economic ones.
On the contrary, the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
economies depended on transient laborers.217 Furthermore, while
municipal governments and religious institutions always provided
last-resort aid for the truly destitute, most skid row service provid-
ers were responding to free-market forces. 18 As economic decline
led to the disappearance of these market-driven services, the devi-
ancies always present on skid row came to define it.2 9
A new campus would operate under conditions at least as bad as
skid rows in their darkest days. Indeed, sociological studies of the
"new" homeless suggest that many suffer from more severe social
pathologies-especially mental illness and severe drug addiction-
than the classic "skid row drunk."2 ' Furthermore, a new campus
would lack the private businesses that had economic incentives to
enforce some social norms of decorum on the old skid rows.2 21 Im-
portantly, the disappearance of the single-room-occupancy
("SRO") hotels that traditionally provided the bulk of skid row
housing likely would exacerbate the disorder of "campus" life. To-
day, emergency shelters serve as the primary means of addressing
the homelessness problem. 2 The very poor, however, have always
27 See, e.g., Hoch & Slayton, supra note 125, at 39 (noting that the "hobo labored at
the wide variety of skilled and unskilled tasks that were part of the taming of the
North American continent").
211 See, e.g., Hoch & Slayton, supra note 125, at 53-60, 64-65, 223.
219 See supra note 139-144 and accompanying text.
220 On the causes of the modern homelessness crisis, especially its connection to drug
abuse and the de-institutionalization of the mentally ill, see generally Jencks, supra
note 145, at 21-74.
221 See Andrew Mair, The Homeless in the Post-Industrial City, 5 Pol. Geography,
355, 357-63 (suggesting that private businesses serving homeless needs made skid row
a viable neighborhood).
2See Martha R. Burt et al., U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., Evaluation of
Continuums of Care for Homeless People 3-4 (2002) (finding that the number of
emergency shelter beds increased twelve percent, from 275,000 to 307,000, between
1988 and 1996).
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viewed shelters as a last resort. While the physical conditions of
SRO and cubicle hotels likely were deplorable, even the worst
"cage hotel" unit offered privacy and autonomy that shelters could
not offer.22' Homeless advocates have suggested replicating SRO-
style accommodation, but the cost of these projects can prove pro-
hibitive.2 Moreover, containing skid row disorder will be much
more difficult today than in the past, when municipal officials sim-
ply expected patrol officers to maintain the "line of respectability"
within the city. Neither the courts nor decent society would coun-
tenance some of the informal methods of disorder control used in
the past, which undoubtedly included the occasional "roughing up"
of "bums" found in the wrong part of town, and the decriminaliza-
tion of public-order offenses has deprived police of the legal tools
employed to backup their informal order-maintenance efforts. 5
The City of Los Angeles's effort to formally combine land-use
and homelessness policy illustrates some of the challenges that a
campus would face. During the 1970s, the city scrapped plans to
demolish its downtown skid row area, partly in response to the
suggestion by poverty advocates that dispersing the homeless could
lead to disorder. 6 Instead, the city council approved an official
skid row containment policy. The local Community Redevelop-
ment Agency spent millions of dollars to support service agencies
and rehabilitate skid row housing. It also relocated missions and
other homeless services away from downtown and into the skid
row and has (until recently) resisted any efforts to provide home-
less services outside of skid row. The containment policy was bol-
stered both by police efforts and physical barriers, such as land-
scaping and building designs, that emphasized the separation of
skid row from the rest of downtown.2 7
22
3 See Jencks, supra note 145, at 107-09 (discussing reasons why the homeless shun
shelters).
14 Hoch & Slayton, supra note 125, at 225.
225 See Wilson, supra note 21, at 118-19 (discussing public-drunkenness arrests and
noting that police actions depend upon who and where the intoxicated individual is: A
vagrant in a central business district will be arrested, but a respectable middle-class
individual is permitted to sober up).
226 See Edward G. Goetz, Land Use and Homeless Policy in Los Angeles, 16 Int'l J.
of Urb. & Regional Res. 540, 544 (1992) (noting that skid row was preserved as a part
of a bargain between the local government and homeless activists).
227 Id. at 545.
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During the homelessness "crisis" of the 1980s, this skid row con-
tainment policy unraveled. In 1984 and 1985, informal temporary
accommodations, such as "tent cities" and cardboard shelters, ap-
peared on skid row. Efforts to remove these structures were met
with public protest and lawsuits by homeless advocates, and city
policy vacillated between accommodation and crackdown. While
the city struggled to devise some permanent solution (experiment-
ing, for example, with an "urban campground"), police occasion-
ally cleared the homeless from public parks and skid row streets
when prompted by complaints from skid row businesses. By the
end of the decade, both city officials and homeless advocates
clearly were disillusioned with the compromise. A skid row burst-
ing at its seams threatened downtown renewal efforts, and home-
less advocates worried that concentrating the homeless allowed
others to turn a blind eye to their plight and impeded efforts to re-
integrate them into society."
In November 2002, the Central City Association, which repre-
sented three hundred downtown businesses, issued a report charac-
terizing skid row as a "downtown[ ] human tragedy" and blaming
the "over concentration of 'homeless' service centers" for an "any-
thing-goes" mentality in the area.229 That same month, Los Angeles
Police Chief William Bratton targeted skid row for street sweeps
that aimed to search for parole and probation violators. (The
ACLU challenged these sweeps in a lawsuit ending in an out-of-
court settlement.2 °) More recently, "Bring L.A. Home,"a partner-
ship of civic and city leaders formed in 2003, released a draft of its
ten-year strategic plan to end homelessness.23 ' The plan calls for
228 Id. at 545-51. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Policing L.A.'s Skid
Row: Crime and Real Estate Development in Downtown Los Angeles, 2005 Chicago
Legal Forum (forthcoming 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=739130 (providing a recent detailed account of L.A.'s skid
row).
29 See Central City Association of Los Angeles, Downtown's Human Tragedy: It's
Not Acceptable Anymore: A Public Health and Safety Plan 2 (2002), available at
http://www.ccala.org/legislative/ll_02/Public%2OHealth %20Safety%20White%2OPap
er%20Final.pdf.
230 See Denise M. Bonilla, Judge Calls Halt to Skid Row Searches, L.A. Times, Apr.
15, 2003, at B4.
"' See Bring L.A. Home!, Draft Framework for the 10-Year Strategic Plan to End




greater dispersal of homeless services to serve the needs of the en-
tire metropolitan area.
2. Disorder Dispersal: Neighborhood-Exclusion Zones and
Regulatory Sweeps
But what of policies designed to shield such vulnerable commu-
nities from disorder by expelling the disorderly, either through the
formal designation of an "exclusion zone" or as the not-so-
unintended result of regulatory sweeps? The case for relocating
disorder away from drug-infested neighborhoods would appear to
be at least as strong as the social-norms justifications for relocating
it to a new skid row. While many city central business districts
struggle, few have fallen to the depths of despair reached in Cin-
cinnati's "Over-the-Rhine," which was designated the city's first
(and only) "drug-exclusion zone." If open-air drug markets have
come to symbolize inner-city chaos, then Over-the-Rhine is an ur-
ban disaster poster child. Featured in the movie Traffic as the ur-
ban wasteland where the U.S. drug czar (played by Michael Doug-
las) searches for his wayward daughter, Over-the-Rhine is home to
7,600 people and averages 2,300 drug arrests per year.232
Obviously, to the extent that drug crime sends the negative so-
cial signals that encourage antisocial and disorderly behavior-and
it is difficult to imagine otherwise-then removing drug dealers
from such a neighborhood should have positive social-influence ef-
fects. At the very least, reducing the number of known drug of-
fenders present in a community like Over-the-Rhine should help
negate the perception that the community tolerates drug offenses,
and, by extension, more serious crimes. The social-influence hy-
pothesis would predict, therefore, that exclusions could help create
an atmosphere where norms favoring law-abiding, orderly behav-
ior will reemerge. Not only will the exclusions reduce the most
visible sign of disorder in the community-rampant drug criminal-
ity-but residents may feel less apprehensive venturing out of their
homes and reasserting their right to use public spaces, and so forth.
Similarly, drug-exclusion policies may enable residents who other-
wise would seek to "escape" to remain in the community and even
22Daniel Lazare, Cincinnati and the X-Factor, 40 Colum. Journalism Rev. 43
(2001).
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encourage other law-abiding individuals to relocate there.233 Fi-
nally, both of the dispersal strategies discussed above minimize the
exercise of police discretion-sweeps transfer disorder-control au-
thority to regulators and exclusion-zone policies target particular
offenders. Both therefore address opponents' concerns that police
will abuse their authority to control disorder.
Nevertheless, adding a spatial dimension to order-maintenance
policy raises racial-justice concerns. As is the case with homeless
campuses, land-use policies like neighborhood-exclusion zones and
regulatory sweeps single out poor, minority communities for en-
forcement-albeit to protect them from disorder, rather than to
foist disorder upon them. Despite this, targeting the "worst"
neighborhoods may send counterproductive signals. A number of
property-law scholars have suggested that regulations "singling
out" individual property owners for disparate regulatory treatment
may heighten the perception of unfairness (and weigh in favor of
compensation for regulatory takings). 34 Similarly, "singling out" a
poor minority neighborhood-either as a drug-exclusion zone or
for particularly vigorous regulatory enforcement-may generate
resentment. For example, following recent race riots in the Over-
the-Rhine neighborhood, commentators rushed to provide a socio-
logical explanation for the violence. Cincinnati's drug-exclusion
law was indicted, along with various other land-use policies, as con-
tributing to a powder keg of racial tensions. One commentator ob-
served, for example, that more than 1500 people were "banished"
from the area between 1996 and 2000, and that the exclusions had
soured police-community relations.35
233 See Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 15, at 823.
234 See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1333,
1344-45 (1991) (arguing that the justification for compensation is greatest when "the
government singles out a private party, in the sense that the government's aims could
have been achieved in many ways but the means chosen placed losses on an individ-
ual"); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence,
90 Mich. L. Rev. 1892, 1954 (1992) (arguing that greater scrutiny is needed when con-
centrated groups impose costs on individuals); Thomas Merrill, Dolan v. City of Ti-
gard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 Denv. U. L. Rev. 859, 880 (1995)
(noting that the "fair share" justification for the regulatory takings reflects the princi-
ple that the Takings Clause prohibits "spot" redistribution).
231 See Lazare, supra note 232, at 43, 44. For other explanations, see Wesley Hogan,
Cincinnati: Race in the Closed City, 32 Soc. Pol'y 49, 49-50 (2001) (blaming city rede-
velopment efforts for bad police-community relations); Michelle Cottle, Boomerang:
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Similar issues have been raised about Chicago's response to the
Morales decision. In addition to narrowing the definition of gang
loitering, Chicago also limited the areas where the ordinance can
be enforced to gang "hot spots" designated by the chief of police.236
A major controversy over the designation of these hot spots has
ensued, with opponents arguing that they escalate the perception
of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement against minorities.237
The literature on "expressive theories" of law may help explain
these controversies. There are two versions of "expressivism." One
focuses on the moral claims made by the law (for example, racial
discrimination is wrong);8 the other is concerned with the instru-
mental consequences of the values expressed by the law.239 For ex-
ample, Richard McAdams has argued that the law, and especially
local ordinances like exclusion-zone policies, serve an "attitudinal"
function; that is, it "changes behavior by signaling the underlying
attitudes of a community. ' Both theories shed light on the wis-
Did Integration Cause the Cincinnati Riots?, New Republic, May 7, 2001, at 26
(same); Heather MacDonald, What Really Happened in Cincinnati, City J., Summer
2001, at 28 (rejecting "gentrification" as the cause of the race riots).236 See Constitutional Rights Foundation Chicago, CRFC Focus Issue: Gangs, Jan.
2, 2002, at http://www.crfc.org/gangs.html (reprinting new Gang Loitering Ordinance);
see also David Einzmann, Chicago Police to Broaden Area for Loitering Arrests, Chi.
Trib., May 2, 2004, at 3 (discussing enforcement policy).
237 See, e.g., Erik Luna, Criminal Law: Constitutional Road Maps, 90 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1125 (2000); Strosnider, supra note 92 at 137; Fran Spielman, Judge OKs
Revised Anti-Loitering Law, Chi. Sun-Times, Mar. 20, 2002 at 10; Gary Washburn,
Daley Pursuing Anti-Gang Law; Despite Challenges, Protests, Mayor to Keep Push-
ing For Loitering Ordinance, Chi. Trib., Jan. 12, 2000 at 1.3'See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public
Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 936, 939 (1991) ("[T]he cul-
tural consequences of the means selected to pursue... instrumental goals can under-
mine their realization."); see also, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1531
(2000) ("Expressive accounts [of law] ... eliminate the conundrums that wholly con-
sequentialist approaches generate.").
2. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1599, 1624-25
(1998) (distinguishing two versions of expressivism in legal literature; one focuses on
the instrumental/consequential value of legal expression and the other on its intrinsic
value).
" Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Or. L. Rev.
339, 340 (2000); see also, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 28 J.
Legal Stud. 585, 586 (1998) (articulating how the law's expression of values serves a
norm-building function); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144
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dom of disorder dispersal strategies. Reactions to the drug-
exclusion policies in Cincinnati and the strategies employed in Chi-
cago to target gang-loitering suggest that policies targeting minor-
ity neighborhoods for heightened enforcement can be interpreted
as signaling official disfavor of minorities.
While city officials hope that the norm-reinforcing function of
these policies will outweigh these potential expressive harms, the
consequential effects of neighborhood-specific dispersal strategies
also are unclear. Kahan and others have suggested that visible pri-
vate crime-prevention strategies, such as bars on windows, may
have the perverse effect of signaling the prevalence of crime, thus
"emboldening law-breakers and demoralizing law-abiders."24 The
same might be said of a policy designating a "drug exclusion zone"
or targeting a neighborhood for a sweep. These policies, in essence,
become an official declaration that crime is out of control in the
community. Thus, policies seeking to "save" poor neighborhoods
by excluding individuals engaged in drug criminality can backfire,
leading both to the appearance of racial bias and signaling that
community renewal efforts are hopeless.
Ultimately, it is difficult to sort out the expressive effects of dis-
persal strategies. For example, conventional wisdom among crimi-
nologists questions the efficacy of criminal (and presumably regu-
latory) enforcement "sweeps." Kelling and Coles observe, for
example, that "[s]weeps, inherently a short term and legally mar-
ginal placebo, often worsen the situation for residents and local po-
lice: they alienate innocent youths caught up in them (as well as
their parents), and are meaningless to real troublemakers for
whom an arrest is a minor irritant." '242 Conversely, some studies of
order-maintenance policing suggest that residents prefer proactive
tactics like sweeps to more amorphous "community policing" ef-
forts.243 Nevertheless, the possibility that dispersal strategies may
send a negative moral message-that is, the government is target-
ing minorities for unfair enforcement-is particularly troubling be-
U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2024-25 (1996) (examining "how legal 'statements' might be de-
signed to change social norms").
41 Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 11, at 387.
212 Kelling & Coles, supra note 8, at 166.
243 See, e.g., David Thatcher, Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 L. &
Soc'y Rev. 765, 769 (2001) (reviewing several studies of police practices).
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cause disorder-dispersal strategies themselves reflect a concern
that order-maintenance policing could lead to the perception of ra-
cial bias.
V. REBALANCING THE COST OF RIGHTS?
The risks inherent in disorder-relocation strategies illustrate
what might be called a constitutional irony. Beginning in the 1960s,
the judicial imposition of strict constitutional limits on police dis-
cretion accelerated the radical deregulation of urban public spaces.
In recent years, the order-maintenance revolution has reignited the
debate about the appropriate scope of police authority to curb dis-
order: Order-maintenance proponents warn that constitutional lim-
its on police discretion undermine police officers' ability to restore
order to the nation's most troubled neighborhoods.2" Opponents
counter that relaxing these rules would threaten civil rights and in-
vite widespread police abuses. 5
Both sides of the order-maintenance debate, however, under-
stand that police discretion will, and should, continue to be limited
in scope. While order-maintenance proponents assert that the in-
ternal police controls should provide the primary check on discre-
tion 6 they also recognize that the judiciary will never wash its
hands of policing the police. Yet, as a result of judicial skepticism
of police discretion-and, importantly, of opponents' determina-
tion to use that skepticism to their every advantage247-the respon-
sibility for curbing disorder is being transferred to planners with
essentially limitless, unchecked discretion. After all, the judiciary
has washed its hands of policing the planners and regulators. As
discussed above, the chances of judges interfering with the site se-
lection for a homeless campus-or preventing the government
" See, e.g., Kahan & Meares, Coming Crisis, supra note 37, at 1153 (predicting the
"imminent death" of the constitutional rules designed to "delimit the permissible
bounds of discretionary law-enforcement authority"); Kelling & Coles, supra note 8,
at 165-66 (discussing the need for discretionary enforcement authority in the Robert
Taylor Homes in Chicago).
2 See generally supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
246 See Kelling & Coles, supra note 8, at 179-93 (recommending guidelines for inter-
nal control of police discretion).
247 See, e.g., id. at 176 (describing the familiar cycle of citizen demand for order, fol-
lowed by the police response, followed by successful legal challenges by civil libertari-
ans).
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from closing buildings during regulatory sweeps-are virtually nil.
This is the "unimaginable" regime that the dissent warned of in
Armendariz v. Penman.248 Judge Trott was incorrect to observe that
a "city cannot simply start throwing innocent people out of private
property to reduce crime in a troubled neighborhood., 249
The most obvious reason for treating property regulation and
law enforcement differently is that more important civil-liberty in-
terests are at stake in the criminal law context. Put simply, the po-
lice can throw you in jail, whereas regulators cannot.250 Yet, for all
of the reasons discussed above, the transfer of authority from the
police to land-use planners may prove more problematic than con-
ventional wisdom, or current constitutional law, recognizes. More-
over, the consequences of the predictive decisionmaking that per-
vades land-use policy are particularly troublesome when
policymakers are designing disorder-relocation policies. The costs
for a poor community of a rule prohibiting, for example, home
businesses should not be underestimated.2 51 But these "prevention
costs" differ in kind from those costs that might follow from the
transfer of order-maintenance authority to land-use planners. As
the above discussion illustrates, disorder-relocation strategies re-
quire planners to designate a community so helpless as to warrant
special protection from the disorderly (an exclusion zone or regula-
tory sweep) or, alternatively, so hopeless as to serve as the perfect
location for a concentration of urban disorder. In either case, plan-
ners may codify the very stereotypes that motivate concern about
order-maintenance policing.
That said, as long as disorder and crime continue to plague in-
ner-city communities, the widespread endorsement of order-
maintenance policies is likely to continue as the constitutional scale
is tipped in favor of disorder-relocation strategies.2 So long as the
248 31 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 1996).
249 Id. at 871 (Trott, J., dissenting).
"This reality partially explains the searching judicial examination of exclusion
zones. These policies not only placed drastic restrictions on offenders' freedom of
movement, but they also depended upon the police to enforce them.251 Garnett, Home-Business Dilemma, supra note 12, at 1216-19; Garnett, Ordering
the City, supra note 10, at 56-57.
22 See Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 15, at 805 (noting that, despite the
overall drop in the crime rate, "America's inner cities remain extremely dangerous,
and as a result tragically hopeless, places to live").
courts impose relatively strict constitutional limits on the police
and relatively lax ones on regulators, city officials will view land-
use policy as an attractive alternative to order-maintenance polic-
ing. Order-maintenance proponents argue that prophylactic rules
that seek to avoid police abuses, such as the vagueness doctrine,
impose high "prevention costs" of their own. This Article high-
lights other costs that have not been adequately considered in the
literature: Limits on order-maintenance policing increase the like-
lihood that city officials will underestimate the costs of disorder-
relocation strategies.
These concerns bolster my inclination to endorse the argument
that courts unnecessarily expose poor communities to a certainty of
crippling disorder by overprotecting against the possibility of po-
lice abuses. The reality, reflected in Morales, is that judicial restric-
tions on police discretion will persist. If disorder-relocation strate-
gies are themselves problematic, it is necessary to ask whether
courts should play a role in rebalancing the cost of rights by polic-
ing the planners, that is, by scrutinizing disorder-relocation strate-
gies. For example, the Sixth Circuit's decision invalidating Cincin-
nati's exclusion zone makes such policies less attractive to city
officials. More searching scrutiny undoubtedly would curb enthusi-
asm for the other disorder-relocation strategies discussed in this
Article as well. The remainder of this Article examines the wisdom
of such a "rebalancing" approach.
A. The "Easy" Answer: Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right
Two objections to this "rebalancing" approach are worthy of se-
rious consideration. First, any suggestion that courts should in-
crease scrutiny of land-use policies invites screams of "Lochner-
ism." Since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 3 both federal
and state courts have refused to second-guess local governments'
predictive judgments about the proper ordering of land uses. As
Justice O'Connor observed in a related context, "[j]udicial defer-
ence is required because, in our system of government, legislatures
are better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced
by an exercise of the taking power."" ' I am deeply skeptical of the
2" 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
254 Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,244 (1984).
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animating assumption behind most American land-use policy-
that government intervention to order urban land uses serves a
crucial order-maintenance function. 255 That said, I do not advocate
substantive review of local land-use policies as the solution to the
cost of rights problems posed by disorder-relocation strategies.
Such review would alter our constitutional order far more so than
relaxing restrictions on police discretion.
Moreover, and importantly, scrutiny of disorder-relocation
strategies would further limit the options available to local officials
struggling to control urban disorder. These officials operate with
one hand tied behind their backs by constitutional limits on order-
maintenance policing. It is arguably unwise to encourage judges to
tie the other hand by carefully reviewing disorder-relocation poli-
cies as well. Robert Ellickson suggests that, despite his view that
police likely are better disorder managers than land-use planners,256
"[h]aving pushed cities in the direction of formal public-space zon-
ing, judges should not strictly scrutinize the policies of municipali-
ties that have accepted this invitation., 25 7
B. A Middle Ground?
These concerns weigh against judicial review of disorder-
relocation policies. Yet, as long as courts continue to carefully scru-
tinize order-maintenance policing innovations, local officials may
seriously discount the potential costs of disorder-relocation efforts.
A more appropriate alternative to substantive review might be for
courts to enforce diligently existing procedural rules so as to mini-
mize the possibility that planners will abuse their vast discretion.
This Section explores the ways that the enforcement of such pro-
cedural limitations can help foster more careful deliberation in the
planning process without eliminating any weapons in the order-
maintenance arsenal. That this job would fall primarily on state
courts who are closer to, and more familiar with, the problems fac-
ing local communities would further dispel concerns about the un-
due interference with the policymaking prerogatives of local offi-
cials.
255 See generally Garnett, Ordering the City, supra note 10.
2. See Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 1243-46.
2" Id. at 1246.
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1. Sweeps: The Regulatory Search Doctrine
First, courts might be more vigilant in policing the line between
law-enforcement and regulatory searches. The regulatory search
doctrine provides that inspectors conducting "regulatory" searches
are governed by different Fourth Amendment standards than po-
lice officers enforcing the criminal law. A property inspector need
only demonstrate that "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with re-
spect to a particular dwelling" in order to obtain an "administra-
tive" search warrant. And, importantly, warrantless inspections are
permitted in regulatory "emergency situations." '258 As a result,
building inspectors may be permitted to go places that police offi-
cers could not, especially because a case likely can be made that
housing code violations rise to "emergency" levels in many older
neighborhoods. The regulatory search doctrine thus makes code
enforcement particularly attractive to local officials by guarantee-
ing inspectors access to suppress physical disorder and relocate the
disorderly.
This situation may create a temptation to blur the line between
regulatory and law enforcement. Consider an example from the
Robert Taylor Homes. A decade ago, after a series of shootings in
these troubled projects, the Chicago Public Housing Authority in-
stituted warrantless law enforcement "sweeps" in the projects.
During the sweeps, housing-authority police searched all of the
residential units in the targeted buildings for weapons. A federal
court invalidated the policy as inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment, failing to find the exigency necessary to overcome
the warrant requirement." The court permitted the housing au-
thority to inspect units for health and safety violations.2" Those in-
258 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967); see also Griffin v. Wis-
consin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 n.4 (1987) (articulating the administrative reasonableness
standard for regulatory searches); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978)
(same). See generally Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 3.9
(2d. ed. 1992) (reviewing the administrative inspections doctrine). The Supreme
Court has further suggested that "warrants should normally be sought only after entry
is refused." Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
... See Pratt v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
" See Herring v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 850 F. Supp. 694, 696 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting
that in "Summeries v. Chicago Housing Authority,... [t]he district court eventually
entered a Consent Decree... [that] permitted the CHA to conduct inspections to
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spections, as described by the Chicago Housing Authority chair-
man, accomplished many of the same goals as the police sweeps:
"We sent in a team of people to identify physical deficiencies in
each unit .... Very often, during that process, they ran across
drugs, contraband, weapons, and other illegal items."26'
In such situations, police officers often accompany inspectors for
"protection." The multi-agency cooperation encouraged by com-
munity policing strategies often places police officers in what
Debra Livingston has called their "community caretaking" role.6
When inspectors descend upon a dangerous neighborhood to con-
duct a sweep, it is likely true that they need police protection and
also that the police can piggyback on an inspection to conduct law
enforcement functions that they might otherwise be unable to per-
form. Once lawfully present inside a building, the officers may then
seize evidence in "plain view," arrest individuals on outstanding
warrants, or perhaps catch them committing crimes.
This cooperation undercuts the traditional justifications for the
regulatory search doctrine. First, it increases the temptation to use
sweeps for law enforcement purposes. Several years ago, for exam-
ple, a federal court held that such cooperation between a housing
inspector and police officers in Youngstown, Ohio violated the
Fourth Amendment. The officers and the inspector jointly devel-
oped lists of addresses with housing code violations and/or sus-
pected drug activity. The inspector, accompanied by some number
of officers, would then go to the property, introduce himself as a
housing inspector, and warn residents who resisted that refusal to
admit him constituted a misdemeanor offense.263 When the practice
was challenged, the District Court ruled that the inspections were a
pretext for conducting warrantless searches for drugs without
probable cause and refused to permit the officials involved to "in-
sulate their Constitutional improprieties under the cloak of de-
partmental cooperation. "
identify and remove unauthorized occupants and to inspect the condition of the hous-
i units").
,, Vincent Lane, Public Housing Sweep Stakes: My Battle with the ACLU, Summer
1994 Pol'y Rev. 68, 69 (describing sweeps and the events leading up to them).
262 See generally Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth
Amendment, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 261.
263 Jones v. City of Youngstown, 980 F. Supp. 908, 915-16 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
264 Id. at 915.
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Second, the regulatory inspections doctrine rests on the pre-
sumption that investigatory searches intrude more on privacy in-
terests than regulatory ones. William Stuntz has observed, "[tihe
regulatory state does not usually snoop around in people's bed-
rooms, and the privacy content of what police can find there is
plausibly distinguishable from the kinds of information that the
state seeks for regulatory purposes."265 But a property owner or
tenant facing a swarm of inspectors, accompanied by a "protective"
police force, is unlikely to be impressed by this argument. For ex-
ample, the Chicago Housing Authority acting as the regulatory
state did snoop in people's bedrooms; the inspectors "looked under
beds to see if the tiles were loose [and] ... in the closets to make
sure there were no leaks.
2
1
Careful review of police-regulator cooperation, such as that
characterized by the Youngstown case discussed above, would not
remove regulatory sweeps from the order-maintenance arsenal-
inspectors likely would have little trouble securing search warrants
for the simple reason that it would not be difficult to demonstrate
"probable cause" that regulatory violations exist. This procedural
hurdle, however, might dissuade officials from viewing sweeps as a
quick fix to the problem of disorder: Undoubtedly, the right to en-
ter a building without a search warrant currently makes sweeps
particularly attractive to local government officials.
The use of regulatory inspections to accomplish disorder-
relocation goals raises questions about the disparate treatment of
law enforcement and regulatory searches. Under current law, even
if the "administrative" motive for an inspection is purely pretex-
tual, police-inspector collusion may be perfectly legal because
"[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis. 267 Perhaps, as Steven Schulhofer has
argued, the "distinction which has preoccupied the Court, between
265 See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1061 (1995). But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth
Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 87, 89 (arguing
that diminished privacy interests do not support the administrative search doctrine).
266 See Lane, supra note 261, at 69.
267 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691, 712-13 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspections of junkyards for stolen
goods, despite the fact that the "inspections" were conducted by police officers
searching for evidence of criminal conduct).
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regulation and 'normal' law enforcement should also be recognized
as chimerical and irrelevant." '268 A full discussion of the implications
of that claim is beyond the scope of this Article.269 But, the aggres-
sive use of regulatory inspections for order-maintenance purposes
may eventually force courts to consider it.
2. Homeless Campuses: Participation and Fairness
With respect to official disorder zones, like homeless campuses,
a relatively simple approach would be for courts to guarantee that
local governments carefully adhered to the procedural guarantees
in standard land-use law. Several different procedures might shield
struggling communities from a new infusion of disorder. First, pub-
lic participation is an integral part of the American land-use plan-
ning process; open-meeting requirements are imposed both by
general state open-meeting laws and by planning and zoning legis-
lation.27 Second, neighboring landowners might be given some
formal role in the planning process. For example, the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act provides that if neighboring landown-
ers protest a rezoning proposal, a change requires a supermajority
approval.271 Careful attention to these procedural hurdles may pre-
vent a local government from simply singling out the most vulner-
able neighborhood for a campus; it might also help diffuse the per-
ception that minority voices are ignored.272
Given the possible environmental justice concerns raised by
campuses, another alternative would be for state legislatures to
adopt "fair siting" requirements. Vicki Been has usefully identified
several different types of fairness requirements: First, "dispersion
2 See Schulhofer, supra note 265, at 89.
269The Court's answer might be to lower "regular" Fourth Amendment standards
rather than to increase regulatory ones. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the
Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137, 2144-50 (2002) (arguing that Fourth Amendment practices
should fluctuate with crime rates).
270 See Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 6.78 (4th ed. 1997).
271 See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas E. Roberts: Land Use Planning and
Control Law § 5.7 (1998). Because a homeless campus proposal will frequently entail
a rezoning, this supermajority requirement could provide significant protection for
neighboring landowners.
27 See, e.g., Garnett, Public-Use Question, supra note 55, at 971-72 (objecting to"quick take" eminent domain procedures that deprive property owners of the chance
to organize effective political resistance to a project).
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strateg[ies]" prohibit LULU concentrations; second, "the impact
statement approach" requires "that decision-makers consider the
impact a siting will have on the 'quality of life' in the community";
third, the "fair share approach" ensure that LULUs are spread
over all communities; fourth, hybrid approaches combine aspects
of the impact-statement and fair-share requirements; and fifth, the
"suspect class" guarantees that any proposal to site a LULU in a
vulnerable community will receive heightened scrutiny.273 None of
these procedures would preclude local governments from creating
homeless campuses, but they might check the political impulse to
site them in neighborhoods where crime and disorder levels al-
ready are unacceptably high. Moreover, local governments' will-
ingness to use such criteria in the disorder-dispersal context sug-
gests that the measurement problems that plague fair-share and
impact-statement requirements are not insurmountable.274 As dis-
cussed previously, high levels of drug crime or gang activity triggers
special neighborhood-level protection in Cincinnati, Chicago, and
Portland.
I am generally skeptical of the over-proceduralization of private
land-use regulation, and I tend to agree with the view that proce-
dural hurdles like impact statements contribute to the rigidity that
plagues land-use planning law.275 The stakes arguably are higher,
however, when the planning decision concerns a project that is de-
signed in part to foist a large amount of relocated and concentrated
disorder on its neighbors. In this situation, it may not be unreason-
able to force policymakers to consider the "fairness" of siting a
project in a neighborhood that is already overloaded with disorder
(or, at a minimum, to ensure that affected voices are heard during
the planning process).
113 See Vicki Been, Conceptions of Fairness in Proposals for Facility Siting, 5 Md. J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 13, 13-17 (1993).
274 See Been, Fairness, supra note 211, at 1066-67 n.351 (reviewing literature sug-
gesting that impact-statement and fair-share mandates pose significant measurement
difficulties).
275 See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Environmental Review in the Land Use Process: New
York's Experience with Seqra, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 2041, 2055 (1992) (criticizing the
use of the environmental review process to "delay, recast, or kill development pro-




At first glance, the land-use policies highlighted in this Article
seem to respond well to critiques of order-maintenance policing.
Disorder-relocation is not, however, a panacea. Historically, cities
have found that both concentration and dispersal strategies entail
serious social costs. Incorporating disorder-relocation efforts into
formal land-use policy likely will increase these costs by eliminat-
ing the flexibility of relying on order-maintenance policing to en-
force the policies (and tweak them as necessary). This Article
sounds a cautionary note to both sides of the order-maintenance
debate. While risk-averse policymakers naturally favor policies
that can survive (or avoid) judicial scrutiny, they should take care
to avoid codifying the failed informal strategies of the past. More-
over, the legal advocates who have pushed government officials
toward using land-management practices to control disorder
should stop to consider these costs before challenging order-
maintenance policing innovations.
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